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CONSTITUTIONAL RETROACTIVITY
IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dov Fox* & Alex Stein**
Abstract: The “watershed” doctrine gives prisoners a constitutional basis to reopen their
cases based on a new due process protection that would have made a difference had it been
announced before their appeals were exhausted. The Supreme Court has imposed nearly
impossible conditions, however, for any new rule of criminal procedure to apply retroactively
to a final conviction or sentence. No such rule can be backdated unless it enhances not only
the accuracy of criminal verdicts, but also “our very understanding of the bedrock” tenets of
fairness in criminal trials. The Court refers to rules that satisfy both these requirements as
“watersheds.” In the quarter-century since it established this doctrine, the Court has denied
the accuracy-and-fairness credentials to every one of the dozens of new rules it has
characterized as procedural and whose watershed status it has considered. Scholarly
consensus accordingly casts watershed doctrine as exceptional, esoteric, and insignificant.
This Article challenges that consensus. We use the dynamic concentration model of game
theory to show how watershed doctrine counteracts the structural undersupply of
constitutional due process rules. The Court maintains too small a caseload to scrutinize more
than a fraction of due process violations or specify every such procedural demand. That
institution is accordingly ill equipped to rein in the punitive tendencies of elected state judges
who owe their jobs to electorates that tend to value crime prevention more than defendants’
rights. Watershed doctrine potentially mitigates this enforcement problem by creating an
extreme, if low-probability, threat of repealing scores of final convictions. By issuing a single
new watershed rule, the Court can mandate sweeping retrials or release of prisoners into the
public. This existential threat provides an overlooked reason why state courts might insulate
their states’ criminal procedures against Supreme Court incursions. To achieve the desired
insulation, state courts can create constitutional safe harbors by trying to align their
procedures with watersheds they project the Court might announce in the future. Indirect
support for this theory comes from our comprehensive study of the hundreds of watershed
decisions that state courts have issued since 1989. We narrowed this list down to the 228
controlling decisions about whether to backdate distinct due process rules across different
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jurisdictions. Our analysis found that twenty-seven, or more than one in nine, of these
decisions inflate the retroactivity rights of criminal defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
The “watershed” doctrine of constitutional retroactivity has since its
inception lived in the margins of criminal procedure. It was born in the
Supreme Court’s 1989 decision Teague v. Lane.1 Teague set forth
narrow conditions under which constitutional change in the rules of
criminal procedure would have the dramatic consequence of requiring
the retrial, resentencing, or release of any prisoner whose conviction or
punishment became final before that new protection was announced.2
This extraordinary kind of due process rule—whose repercussions reach
farther than any in our criminal or constitutional law, so rare that one
like it has never been recognized—is what the Supreme Court has
referred to as a “watershed.”3
The Court’s recent decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana4 brought into
sharp relief the Court’s reluctance to apply that rule directly. Henry
Montgomery had been in prison since 1963, sentenced to die there under
the mandatory life sentence he received for a murder conviction when he
was seventeen.5 Nearly fifty years later, the Court, in Miller v.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Id. at 306–10.
See, e.g., id. at 311.
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
State v. Montgomery, 181 So. 2d 756, 757 (La. 1966).
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Alabama,6 established a new rule that the Eighth Amendment ban on
“cruel and unusual punishment” entitles juveniles to individualized
sentencing for life incarceration without the possibility of parole.7 In
Montgomery, the Court applied that rule to individuals like the
petitioner, whose convictions and sentences had been finalized (even
long) before its 2012 announcement in Miller. That rule’s retroactive
application means that, in states like Louisiana, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania with significant numbers of juvenile homicide offenders,
more than 1000 prisoners once condemned for life must now be
considered for parole. Hamstrung by its previous refusals to recognize
newly announced rules as watersheds, however, the Court was forced to
reach this result by “rewriting” Miller’s procedural mandate as
substantive.8
Under the watershed doctrine, a new due process right9 applies to
final convictions only when that protection manifestly improves the
accuracy of convictions and does no less than “alter our understanding
of the bedrock procedural elements.”10 The retroactive application of
these so-called watershed rules benefits not only defendants facing trial
or appealing guilty verdicts, but also those who have exhausted their
appeals.11 A defendant whose conviction and sentence has become final
can invoke this doctrine in any habeas proceeding or other suit for postconviction relief.12 When backdating that due process reform casts doubt
on whether a prisoner’s guilty verdict was accurate or whether his trial
6. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
7. Id. at 2471.
8. Montgomery, 132 S. Ct. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a sustained argument that Miller is a
watershed, see Beth Caldwell, Miller v. Alabama as a Watershed Procedural Rule: The Case for
Retroactivity, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE S1 (2015). On why the Montgomery majority’s
characterization of Miller conflicts with the Supreme Court’s previous formulations of what
distinguishes a rule of criminal law as “substantive” as opposed to procedural, see infra notes 20–
25, 206–20 and accompanying text.
9. We use the broad conception of due process that includes not only the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ protections, but also the Sixth Amendment’s guarantees of fair trial: the defendants’
right to confront prosecution witnesses, to secure compulsory process, and to have a trial by jury.
See generally Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986) (analyzing due process as a bundle of
rights); Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication—A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957) (same). See also Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process:
The Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 339 (1987) (“By 1868, due process had
come to connote a certain core procedural fairness when government moved against a citizen’s life,
liberty, or property.”).
10. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
11. See infra notes 38–46 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 52–72 and accompanying text.
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was fair, the court must order a retrial or exonerate the defendant
immediately.13
The Supreme Court has so narrowed such “watershed” rules,
however, that the doctrine is highly exceptional.14 Over the past quartercentury since Teague, the Court has refused to confer watershed status
on even one new rule of constitutional criminal procedure among the
dozens it has announced.15 The only rule that would have qualified, the
Court has said, is the right to assistance of counsel.16 This rule was first
announced in Gideon v. Wainwright,17 long before Teague, and the
Court has characterized this rule’s unique centrality to “basic due
13. See infra text accompanying notes 86–99 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 100–07 and accompanying text.
15. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 289 (2008) (denying watershed retroactivity to new
procedural rule requiring cross-examination for inculpatory testimonial statements); Whorton v.
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007) (same); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417–18 (2004) (denying
watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule barring capital sentencing schemes that require juries
to disregard mitigating factors not unanimously found); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352
(2004) (denying watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule that aggravating factors which make
a defendant eligible for the death penalty must be proved to a jury rather than a judge); Tyler v.
Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 669–70 (2001) (declining an invitation to interpret as retroactive the prohibition
on giving jurors instructions that they could understand as allowing conviction without proof
beyond a reasonable doubt); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997) (denying watershed
retroactivity to new procedural right to inform a sentencing jury contemplating capital punishment
that defendant is not a future danger because he is ineligible for parole); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520
U.S. 518, 539–40 (1997) (refusing to apply retroactively the rule that invalid aggravating
circumstances cannot be weighed in capital sentencing); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170
(1996) (denying watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule that prosecutors must give adequate
notice of the evidence the state intends to use in the sentencing phase); Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S.
115, 120–21 (1995) (per curiam) (denying watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule that
defendants who flee after conviction retain a right to appeal); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396
(1994) (denying watershed retroactivity to proposed double jeopardy rule that would have prevented
state from again seeking to have defendant sentenced as persistent felony offender on retrial
following reversal of his sentence); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345 (1993) (denying
watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule forbidding jury instructions that allow murder
convictions without consideration of diminished mental state); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,
478 (1993) (denying watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule proscribing jury instructions
that bar a sentencing jury to consider mitigating evidence); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416
(1990) (denying watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule barring police-initiated interrogation
following a suspect’s request for counsel); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 486 (1990) (denying
watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule that new rule that bars trial courts from “telling the
jury to avoid any influence of sympathy”); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 233 (1990) (denying
watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule forbidding “the imposition of a death sentence by a
sentencer that has been led to the false belief that the responsibility for determining the
appropriateness of the defendant’s capital sentence rests elsewhere”).
16. E.g., Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418–19; Beard, 542 U.S. at 417–18; O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 167;
Gray, 518 U.S. at 170; Parks, 494 U.S. at 495.
17. 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal defendants are constitutionally
entitled to counsel at the government’s expense).
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process” as “unlikely . . . to emerge” again.18 Accordingly, not a single
prisoner since Teague has, by judgment of the Supreme Court, benefited
from a constitutional reform that took hold after direct review of his
case, no matter how profound that reform had been and whether it would
have enhanced the conviction’s accuracy if it were to apply at trial or on
appeal. Those reforms offer no grounds for relief after a conviction
becomes final under the verboten due process regime that has, if even
one day later, been authoritatively declared constitutionally deficient.
It is hardly surprising that the Montgomery Court, in declaring Miller
retroactive, refused to classify that rule’s individualized sentencing
guarantee as a watershed.19 The futility of such watershed recognition
explains the majority’s strained holding that Miller is not a due process
rule at all.20 The Miller rule is more plausibly characterized as
procedural and not substantive. It does not place “primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe”21 or particular “persons covered by the statute
beyond the State’s power to punish.”22 Instead, it “mandates only that a
sentencer follow a certain process.”23 Justice Scalia elaborated on this in
his dissent:
[T]he majority opinion quotes passages from Miller that assert
such things as “mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
children ‘pos[e] too great a risk of disproportionate
punishment’” and “appropriate occasions for sentencing
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”
But to say that a punishment might be inappropriate and
disproportionate for certain juvenile offenders is not to say that
it is unconstitutionally void. All of the statements relied on by
the majority do nothing more than express the reason why the
new, youth-protective procedure prescribed by Miller is
desirable: to deter life sentences for certain juvenile offenders.
On the issue of whether Miller rendered life-without-parole
penalties unconstitutional, it is impossible to get past Miller’s
unambiguous statement that “[o]ur decision does not

18. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313; see also Whorton, 549 U.S. at 417; Beard, 542 U.S. at
417; O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 167; Gray, 518 U.S. at 170; Parks, 494 U.S. at 495.
19. See infra notes 199–11 and accompanying text.
20. For conflicting state court decisions, see infra note 212.
21. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).
22. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (citing Parks, 494 U.S. at 494–95; Teague,
489 U.S. at 311).
23. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012) (emphasis added).
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categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders” and
“mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain
process . . . before imposing a particular penalty.” It is plain as
day that the majority is not applying Miller, but rewriting it.24
The Montgomery majority reached a just result for the wrong reason.
Justice required that the constitutional rule announced in Miller apply
retroactively to prisoners who did not get the benefit of that rule by the
time that their sentences were finalized. But the reason underlying this
intuition is not that a right to individualized sentencing places particular
conduct or persons beyond the power to punish. Rather, it is that Miller
afforded juvenile defendants a fundamentally important due process
protection. But justice and the Teague doctrine sail apart: Teague
jurisprudence closed this avenue off to the Supreme Court majority in
Montgomery, insofar as it could not plausibly hold that Miller was as
important as Gideon, marked off as the only watershed. The Court’s
“rewriting” of the Miller rule from procedural to substantive made that
constitutional holding retroactive through the back door that its Teague
jurisprudence left open.25
The Court’s cramped interpretation of the watershed doctrine has
pushed due-process retroactivity to the margins of constitutional
criminal procedure. The Teague decision does not even appear in several
leading textbooks of criminal procedure,26 and those that do cite it give
watershed doctrine cursory treatment.27 The handful of scholarly articles
24. Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 743 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. See infra notes 204–18 and accompanying text.
26. E.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2011);
JOSEPH G. COOK, PAUL MARCUS & MELANIE D. WILSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (7th ed. 2009);
PHILIP E. JOHNSON & MORGAN CLOUD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FROM
INVESTIGATION TO TRIAL (4th ed. 2005); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS & LENESE C.
HERBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2010); RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES (5th ed. 2013).
27. E.g., NEIL P. COHEN & DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE
PROCESS, CASES AND MATERIALS 844 (2d ed. 2000) (declining to specify the two exceptions to the
Teague bar on retroactivity); JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 1391–92 (4th ed. 2010) (briefly questioning watershed
rules); YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS
1603 (12th ed. 2009) (providing a single paragraph of the Court’s discussion of watershed rules);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6, at 1371–72 (5th ed. 2009) (explaining
that most “new rules fail [Teague’s second] exception because they are not sufficiently
fundamental, and are less ‘sweeping’ than Gideon”); ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 1462–63 (3d ed. 2010) (including Teague excerpts from
Justice White’s concurrence and Justice Brennan’s dissent); ARTHUR R. MILLER & CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 1450–54 (2d ed.
2003) (discussing only Teague’s definition of “new” rules and not its exceptions to
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that address this doctrine make clear that they consider it obscure and
inoperative.28
This Article argues that the universally-perceived irrelevance of the
watershed doctrine misses its fundamental role in constitutional criminal
procedure. The Article uses the dynamic concentration model of game
theory to show how this doctrine quietly encourages courts to align their
state’s criminal procedures, beyond existing protections, with
projections about the more generous vision of trial fairness that those
protections represent.29 Watershed doctrine, by threatening to repeal
nonretroactivity); MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE
COURTROOM 995 (5th ed. 2009) (noting the watershed exception in a sentence); STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND
COMMENTARY 27–28 (9th ed. 2010) (discussing watersheds merely as a subsidiary of AEDPA
doctrine); JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ & WELSH S. WHITE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 965 (7th ed. 2012) (citing Teague without noting
its core holding, let alone its watershed doctrine); LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL PROCESS: CASES,
COMMENT, QUESTIONS 1227–28 (7th ed. 2004) (noting the watershed exception without
discussion); CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 29.06, at 913 (5th ed. 2008) (noting the “near impossibility
of meeting Teague’s second exception”).
28. See, e.g., Roger D. Branigin III, Sixth Amendment—The Evolution of the Supreme Court’s
Retroactivity Doctrine: A Futile Search for Theoretical Clarity, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1128, 1147 (1990) (“The theoretical structure that the [Teague] plurality constructed . . . ultimately
collapses in the absence of any substantive content.”); Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen
Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness,
and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161, 196 (2005) (describing the
watershed doctrine as “an exception so narrow that no case—not one—from 1989 to 2004 has been
found to fall within it”); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2433,
2434–35 (1993) (acknowledging criticism that watershed doctrine “produce[d] a largely toothless
habeas”); Ezra D. Landes, A New Approach To Overcoming the Insurmountable “Watershed Rule”
Exception to Teague’s Collateral Review Killer, 74 MO. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“On fourteen
occasions the Court has been asked to determine whether or not a new rule is watershed. All
fourteen times the Court has found the rule not to be watershed.”); Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for
Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 362, 374–75 (1991) (“The Teague exceptions do
little . . . because they apply only to crimes so offbeat and punishments so cruel that they are beyond
the constitutional pale, and to primitive pre-incorporation-era due process violations featuring lynch
mobs, corrupt prosecutors, and cops with rubber hoses.”); Christopher M. Smith, Note, Schriro v.
Summerlin: A Fatal Accident of Timing, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1325, 1362 (2005) (“Fifteen years of
Teague jurisprudence . . . have attached a stigma of futility to [retroactivity] arguments.”); Larry W.
Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2391 (1993) (arguing that Teague’s
“new rule” jurisprudence “would be utterly bizarre if it were not so obviously contrived . . . in
service of political objectives”).
29. Watersheds play no significant role in the federal system because the Supreme Court dictates
rules and hears appeals. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, interpreted in McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 340–47 (1943), and Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 198–99 (1943) (authorizing
the Supreme Court to set forth rules of evidence and procedure for federal courts); Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012) (“[The Supreme Court has] the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district
courts . . . and courts of appeals.”). Based on the Rules Enabling Act, the Court promulgated both
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scores of finalized convictions with a single judicial decision, helps
protect criminal defendants in real, profound, and heretofore
unrecognized ways.
Here is why: constitutional criminal procedure suffers from the
structural undersupply of legal norms that protect defendants. The
Supreme Court has just nine justices and a busy docket. Few of the
eighty or so cases it hears every year concern the fairness of criminal
trials. As a result, the Court can codify only a handful of due process
principles to govern the myriad distinct criminal procedures adopted by
police and prosecutors in the fifty-one American jurisdictions. The
Court’s limited workforce ill equips it to detail the meaning of those
principles or scrutinize but a fraction of state court decisions that
implicate them. So the Court has trouble overseeing the provision of
justice for the accused nationwide.
Watershed retroactivity fills these gaps. Under this doctrine, a verdict
that undermines the basic fairness and accuracy of criminal convictions
risks repeal even when it does not run afoul of established constitutional
precedents. This poses the threat that every prisoner whose conviction
conflicts with a new watershed rule is entitled to acquittal or at least
retrial. If state courts were to deny a prisoner these post-conviction
remedies, he could petition for habeas relief in a federal court that would
be forced to quash his guilty verdict. All similarly situated prisoners
would have their convictions reversed too.
That watersheds are rare makes their extreme repercussions unlikely.
Yet their aftermaths of wholesale retrials or even mass exoneration are
grave enough for state courts to fear. By threatening broadscale release
of potentially dangerous criminals, watershed doctrine tends to
counteract state judges’ incentives to convict. These punitive incentives
stem from state judges’ reliance, as elected officials, on voting citizens
who tend to scorn judges who let prisoners go free.30 Judicial election
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See generally
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.2, at 5–6 (2009) (describing
enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence).
30. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 700, 727–28 (1995); Thomas M. Ross, Rights at the Ballot Box: The
Effect of Judicial Elections on Judges’ Ability to Protect Criminal Defendants’ Rights, 7 LAW &
INEQ. 107, 107 (1988); Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Skewed Justice: Citizens United,
Television Advertising, and State Supreme Court Justices’ Decisions in Criminal Cases, SKEWED
JUSTICE, skewedjustice.org [https://perma.cc/277S-KQDN] (last visited Feb. 10, 2015); see also
John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial Accountability in California,
70 JUDICATURE 81, 87–89 (1986) (describing a media campaign that succeeded in unseating three
California Supreme Court Justices for being soft on crime); Joanna Cohn Weiss, Tough on Crime:
How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U.
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scholars find that even in politically progressive jurisdictions, “voters
typically perceive the courts as too lenient in dealing with criminal
defendants” and that criminal justice is among the most powerful
“judicial issues that opponents can raise against sitting judges.”31
Consequently, “all judges are effectively forced either to adjudicate
tough(er) on crime or risk losing office.”32 Despite all good-faith efforts
and intentions, state judges operating under such pressures may be
tempted to take advantage of the Supreme Court’s inability to review
many cases at the expense of due process rights in areas not yet covered
by constitutional precedent.
The watershed threat attaches a high risk to this self-serving strategy.
When state courts rely on a criminal procedure that the Supreme Court
subsequently outlaws by a watershed rule, they might become
responsible for a flood or retrials and the sprawling release of convicted
prisoners into the public. This rebuke would make the courts look
bungling at best, thus unfit to serve: their constituents would perceive
them as incapable of devising procedures that dependably separate guilty
criminals from defendants who are innocent.
To avoid this extreme, if unlikely, repercussion, state courts must
bring their criminal procedures into line with their best guess of how due
process jurisprudence will develop in the Supreme Court. By forcing
state judges to enforce trial protections that align with the Court’s
projected vision of fairness for the accused, watersheds help the
shorthanded Court to more effectively govern constitutional criminal
procedures across the country.
This dynamic tracks the famous chess adage, “the threat is stronger
than the execution.”33 The mere existence of the grave watershed threat
L. Rev. 1101, 1109–12 (2006) (citing studies that suggest that “judges who wish to be reelected
might give defendants harsher sentences than they would in a world without continual scrutiny by
the electorate”).
31. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter’s Perspective, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 34–35 (2003); see also Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative
Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, 2000 (1988) (“Every judge’s campaign slogan, in
advertisements and on billboards, is some variation of ‘tough on crime.’”); David E. Pozen, The
Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 287 (2008) (“Given the political unpopularity
of criminal defendants as a group and the unique salience of crime in the public perception of
judicial behavior, incumbent judges may be most vulnerable when their opponents are able to
characterize them as soft on crime.”); Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing:
Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 79
(1985) (calling criminal law “a lightning rod in judicial campaigns”).
32. Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for
Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 317 (2010); see id. at 365–68 (citing studies to support this
proposition).
33. This principle was articulated by celebrated grandmasters Savielly Tartakower and Aron
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pushes state courts to manage their own criminal procedures in a way
that makes the actual execution of watersheds unrequired. However
unlikely the Supreme Court is to drop the watershed bomb, that
possibility still drives state courts to eschew rules that conflict with that
Court’s more generous vision of fairness to the accused and invoke state
and federal constitutional law to block legislative initiatives that run
afoul of that vision. Thus, the Supreme Court will almost never find it
necessary to establish a watershed rule for criminal trials. The threat
alone is enough.34
Economists call this enforcement method “dynamic concentration.”35
Take the proverbial Lone Ranger facing an angry mob that seeks to
lynch a prisoner the Ranger must protect. The Ranger is down to one
bullet in his revolver and the mob knows it. The Ranger saves the
prisoner by telling the mob: “[w]hoever takes the first step forward,
dies.”36 His threat to kill one of the mobsters, given their inability to
coordinate, enables the Ranger to rein in more of them than his limited
enforcement capacity would otherwise make possible.37 The Supreme
Court’s ability to repeal errant state court decisions is like the Ranger’s
to restrain the mob. Just as the Ranger’s single-bullet threat effectively
constrains the mob, so the watershed doctrine might allow the Court to
keep state courts in check by threatening extreme, even if unlikely,
repercussions for wielding unfair practices against the accused.
Supreme Court precedent warrants denying watershed status to new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure. But we analyzed all 358
watershed decisions issued by state courts between inception of this
doctrine in February 1989, when Teague was decided, and July 2015.
This examination reveals a striking proportion—one out of nine—that
Nimzowitsch. See generally ARON NIMZOWITSCH, MY SYSTEM (Lou Hays ed., 1991).
34. For a similar game-theoretic legal insight originating from chess, see Daniel J. Seidmann &
Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth
Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 441 & n.38 (2000) (using the first-mover disadvantage called “zugzwang” to explain guilty suspects’ interrogation predicament).
35. See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS
PUNISHMENT 49–65 (2009).
36. Id. at 55.
37. See id. at 176–77 (explaining that this method of enforcing the law can be particularly
effective against drug gangs); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive
Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26, 37–39 (2009) (recommending dynamic concentration
method for securing police compliance with civil rights); Winston Harrington, Enforcement
Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 29, 43–48 (1988) (recommending
dynamic concentration method for environmental-protection enforcement and developing formal
analysis of that method); Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated Enforcement, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 325, 363–
74 (2014) (analyzing dynamic concentration as a method for enforcing tax code).
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grants retroactive application to new due process rules. And in the
absence of any new constitutional protection tantamount to the right to
counsel, not a single state court decision during that period could of
course interpret as non-watershed a rule that might have qualified for
that status.
Various factors might contribute to this number of watershed
inflations. For example, judges or their electorates might favor defendant
rights. Alternatively, overworked judges might misapply Teague,
confused why the Supreme Court would bother talking about a
watershed doctrine that can never be satisfied. Among such
explanations, a particularly interesting one has been overlooked: state
judges do not consider watersheds as an empty threat. This Article
examines the extent to which state judges seek to minimize the toll that
the imposition of watershed status by the Supreme Court would take on
their professional reputations and state systems of criminal justice.
Our argument unfolds in three parts. Part I spells out the puzzling
redundancy of the watershed doctrine. Part II uses the dynamic
concentration model of game theory to explain the doctrine’s role as a
quiet watchdog of constitutional criminal procedure across the states.
Part III presents our analysis of all watershed cases decided in the state
courtsthese cases appear in the Appendix. We conclude by showing
how this dynamic theory of constitutional enforcement supports sound
predictions for criminal justice in the states.
I.

THE RETROACTIVITY PUZZLE

The Warren Court expanded criminal defendants’ constitutional rights
to a degree not seen before or since. By incorporating the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it afforded criminal defendants a range of new
protections against state governments. The Court interpreted the
Constitution to require that police warn criminal suspects of certain
rights;38 to prohibit incriminating inferences from silence;39 and to
exclude from the trial evidence obtained by the government in violation
of the Constitution.40
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing arrest warnings). The Court declined
to apply Miranda retroactively and limited it to trials that began after the decision was announced.
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966).
39. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying right-to-silence to states).
40. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to states). The Court declined
to apply this rule retroactively to cases that were final at the time the Court decided Mapp.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322
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Because these constitutional protections were new, some—indeed
many—defendants had been convicted under what would now constitute
a constitutional violation. For defendants whose cases were still on
direct appeal, newly announced rules automatically apply. Their cases
thereby demand, if not outright acquittal, at least a retrial to determine
whether such violation was harmless. But it was far less clear whether
those new rules would benefit defendants who had, by the time the new
rule was announced, been denied relief by all appellate courts.
Defendants who exhaust their direct appeal process can still seek
collateral relief under state post-conviction41 and federal habeas corpus
review.42 Whether new procedural rules would apply on collateral
review loomed over the Warren revolution in criminal defendants’
rights.43 Would defendants whose convictions had become final before
the announcement of these new rights receive the rights’ benefit in a
habeas proceeding?44 Defendants have interests in their having had a
trial that comports with the Constitution under same protections afforded
to similarly situated defendants.45 Society, on the other hand, has a
strong interest in leaving undisturbed a trial process that was
constitutional at the time it was carried out and in avoiding the costs of
retrial for police, prosecutors, judges, and victims.46
(1987).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2012).
42. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (providing that a federal court may
“entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States”).
43. John Hart Ely, a Warren clerk, argued that this revolution in criminal rights was driven less
by concerns for procedural justice than it was by conceptions of equality among citizens and wouldbe defendants. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
172 (1980).
44. A criminal verdict becomes final “where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed.” Linkletter, 381
U.S. at 622 n.5.
45. Under our current retroactivity laws, even capital defendants sentenced in a manner that
plainly violates the Constitution are not entitled to retrial on collateral review and may be put to
death. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Justice Brennan explained these perverse consequences: “[t]his
extension [of Teague to capital sentencing] means that a person may be killed although he or she
has a sound constitutional claim that would have barred his or her execution had this Court only
announced the constitutional rule before his or her conviction and sentence became final.” Id. at 341
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1764–67 (1991) (discussing cost of retroactivity
within a law of remedies framework); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium
Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1084–94 (1997) (noting prudential considerations that argue
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Linkletter’s Balancing Test

The Warren Court confronted these competing interests in 1965. In a
landmark decision, Linkletter v. Walker,47 the Court considered whether
to give retroactive effect in habeas proceedings to the exclusionary rule
announced in Mapp v. Ohio.48 The Court held that a new rule would
apply retroactively only when the protection it gives defendants
outweighs its adverse impact on the states that relied on the old regime
in their administration of justice.49 The Court clarified that adverse
consequences of the new rule’s retroactive application for the states are a
function of how firmly entrenched the old rule was and how many
convictions courts would have to reverse or reopen by uprooting that
rule.50 After accounting for these factors, the Court declined to apply the
Mapp rule to cases pending in federal habeas.51
The Linkletter Court had no occasion to consider whether the same
balancing test would apply on direct appeal.52 Ten years later, in Stovall
v. Denno,53 it answered the question in the affirmative.54 Courts should
apply the same balance of state and defendant interests on direct appeal,
it held in Denno, refusing to attach any “overriding significance”55 to the
distinction between “convictions now final . . . and convictions at
various stages of trial and direct review.”56 Linkletter’s interestbalancing model of retroactivity—applicable on direct review too—
prevailed for over twenty years.57 During that period, it spurred criticism
from scholars and jurists.58
both for and against retroactivity of laws); Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous
Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1097–1100 (1999)
(developing a decision-time model of retroactivity that would apply to new civil rules).
47. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
48. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
49. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1967); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636–38.
50. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637.
51. See id. at 638.
52. See id. at 627.
53. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
54. Id. at 300–01.
55. Id. at 300.
56. Id.
57. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 46, at 1743–46.
58. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 642 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for “perpetrat[ing] a grossly invidious and unfair discrimination against Linkletter simply
because he happened to be prosecuted in a State that was evidently well up with its criminal court
docket”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303 (1989) (“[C]ommentators have ‘had a veritable field
day’ with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being ‘more than mildly negative.”
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Most influential among Linkletter’s critics was the distinguished
federal courts scholar, Paul Mishkin.59 Mishkin would apply new rules
automatically on direct review; treating appellants differently from
defendants who had not yet been convicted, he argued, would fetishize
the timing of trial procedures.60 Thus, newly announced rules should
automatically be given full effect for any defendant whose conviction
had not yet become final.61 On collateral review, Mishkin would grant
retroactivity for new rules that enhance the accuracy of criminal
convictions.62 This measure would serve “the prime function of habeas
corpus . . . to secure individual freedom from unjustified confinement.”63
Professor Mishkin explained this principle in the following words:
Valuing the liberty of the innocent as highly as we do, earlier
proceedings whose reliability does not measure up to current
constitutional standards for determining guilt may well be
considered inadequate justification for continued detention. For
to continue to imprison a person without having first established
to the presently required degree of confidence that he is not in
fact innocent is indeed to hold him, in the words of the habeas
corpus statute, “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” On
this basis, habeas corpus would assess the validity of a
conviction, no matter how long past, by any current
constitutional standards which have an intended effect of
enhancing the reliability of the guilt-determining process.64
These views helped convince Justice Harlan that he should not have
joined the Linkletter majority. Justice Harlan embraced Mishkin’s
approach to direct appeals in a pair of dissents criticizing Linkletter’s
balancing test he himself had voted to adopt just a few years prior. In
Desist v. United States,65 Justice Harlan complained that Linkletter’s
refusal to automatically apply the rules it announced to pending cases on
(citing Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L.
REV. 1557, 1558 (1975))); Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or
“Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect
to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 12–24 (2009) (discussing critiques of Linkletter).
59. Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time
and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965).
60. Id. at 77.
61. Id. at 77–78.
62. Id. at 101–02.
63. Id. at 79.
64. Id. at 81–82 (footnote omitted).
65. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
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direct appeal invited the Justices, by virtue of which case they agree to
hear, to “pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants
those who alone will receive the benefit of a ‘new’ rule of constitutional
law.”66 Relief would be granted to the one prisoner whose case the
Justices had granted certiorari to, but denied to the other who was
convicted at the same time, in the same constitutionally defective
manner. “[A]ll ‘new’ rules of constitutional law,” Justice Harlan opined,
“must, at a minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject
to direct review by this Court at the time the ‘new’ decision is handed
down.”67 After a defendant’s conviction had become final, Justice
Harlan worried that retroactive application would beget never-ending
relitigation of guilty verdicts whenever a new rule was announced.68 So
he would preserve the stability of convictions on collateral review by
declining to apply procedural rules that had not been available to a
defendant prior to his habeas petition.69
Fifteen years after Harlan’s dissents, the Supreme Court vindicated
his criticism of Linkletter’s approach to direct review. In Griffith v.
Kentucky,70 the Court gave the benefit of new rules to defendants who
had not exhausted their appeals.71 The Court ruled unambiguously that
“failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases
pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional
adjudication.”72 This holding spoke only of defendants who had not yet
completed the appellate process. Intentionally or not, Griffith said
nothing about the retroactive application of new rules for convictions
that had already become final.
B.

Teague and the Watershed

The Supreme Court addressed this issue two years later in Teague v.
Lane.73 That seminal case jettisoned Linkletter’s balancing test and set
up a new retroactivity doctrine that has endured ever since. Under
66. Id. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. As Justice Harlan later elaborated, to announce new rules left inapplicable on direct
review would “restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law.”
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680–81 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
68. Desist, 394 U.S. at 261–62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 687–88 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
71. Id. at 314.
72. Id. at 322–23.
73. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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Teague, the Supreme Court declared that a new rule of constitutional
criminal procedure always applies to direct review of a prisoner’s
conviction. But that rule is never backdated on collateral review—
unless, that is, that rule of constitutional criminal procedure is so
important as to constitute a “watershed.”74
The case presented the federal habeas petition of Frank Teague, an
African-American man convicted by an all-white jury and sentenced to
more years in jail than he had to live.75 During jury selection, the
prosecutor had used all of his peremptory challenges to strike black
jurors.76 Teague was denied relief by state and federal courts up to the
highest level.77 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Teague’s
case presented two retroactivity questions. The first is whether his
habeas petition could benefit from the new rule against unlawful
discrimination in jury selection that the Court announced in Batson v.
Kentucky.78 The Court had already determined that Batson marked an
unequivocal break from the previous standard in Swain v. Alabama79 that
allowed prosecutors to exercise preemptory challenges on the basis of
race.80 The Court had little trouble concluding that Batson’s new bar on
race-based elimination of prospective jurors did not apply to a
conviction and sentence like Teague’s that had become final.81
More difficult and important is the second question: whether the “fair
cross section” requirement set forth in Taylor v. Louisiana82 extends
beyond the jury pool to the seated jury.83 In Teague, the Court refused
even to reach its merits, however. From the reasons for this refusal,
watershed doctrine was forged. A plurality of the Court declined to
address the scope of the “fair cross section” requirement for a procedural
reason: namely, that however unrepresentative the jury that convicted
Teague, the right he sought to vindicate would not do him any good
because he had already exhausted his appeals.84 Justice O’Connor,
74. Id. at 313–14.
75. Id. at 292.
76. Id. at 292–93.
77. Id. at 294–95.
78. Id. at 295–96.
79. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
80. In Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986), the Court found that Batson constituted a clear break
with precedent and declined to apply Batson to cases that were final when Batson was decided. Id.
at 259–60.
81. Teague, 489 U.S. at 296.
82. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
83. Teague, 489 U.S. at 299–300.
84. Id. at 316.
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writing for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy,
characterized Teague’s “fair cross section” claim as a would-be new rule
that could not in any event be applied to defendants like him whose
convictions had already become final.85
Teague established that “[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a
threshold question” that courts must address before considering whether
there exists a potentially applicable new rule of constitutional criminal
procedure.86 The plurality defined as “new” any rule that “imposes a
new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” whose “result
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s
conviction became final.”87 The Supreme Court later clarified that
the source of a “new rule” is the Constitution itself, not any
judicial power to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the
underlying right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the
new rule. What we are actually determining when we assess the
“retroactivity” of a new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly
announced right, but whether a violation of the right that
occurred prior to the announcement of the new rule will entitle a
criminal defendant to the relief sought.88
The Teague Court reaffirmed its holding from Griffith that these new
rules of constitutional criminal procedure apply automatically to
defendants whose convictions or sentences had not yet become final.89
So after Griffith and Teague, prisoners who have direct appeals still
available to them get the full benefit of constitutional rules that had not
yet been announced when they were convicted and sentenced.
Justice O’Connor also made clear that the point of applying new rules
retroactively on direct review was not to purge trials of all constitutional
error.90 Rather, it was to deter the most egregious kinds of police or
prosecutorial abuses: when it happens, for example, “that the proceeding
was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly made
85. Id. at 301.
86. Id. at 300.
87. Id. at 301 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan argued that this definition of “new” rules
sweeps too broadly:
[f]ew decisions on [direct] appeal or collateral review are “dictated” by what came before.
Most such cases involve a question of law that is at least debatable, permitting a rational judge
to resolve the case more than one way. Virtually no case that prompts a dissent on the relevant
legal point, for example, could be said to be “dictated” by prior decisions.
Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
88. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008).
89. Teague, 489 U.S. at 304.
90. Id. at 312.
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use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was based on a
confession extorted from the defendant by brutal methods.”91 Courts
could adequately deter such abuses, in the plurality’s view, by assuring
that both trials and appeals adhere to the constitutional rules in effect at
the time.92 For that reason, Justice O’Connor wrote, new rules of
constitutional criminal procedure need not apply retroactively to
finalized convictions.93
To this general bar on the retroactive application of constitutionally
required rules of due process, Teague carved out a single, narrow
exception.94 Among all new procedural rules, it held, the only ones that
apply retroactively on collateral review are “watersheds.”95 To qualify as
a “watershed,” the plurality explained, a rule of criminal procedure must
be instrumental to the fairness of trials and the accuracy of convictions.96
With respect to trial fairness, a “watershed” must do no less than “alter
our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements” essential to the
fairness of the proceeding.97 And for the accuracy of convictions, the
Court has clarified that “it is not enough to say that the rule is aimed at
improving the accuracy of trial or that the rule is directed toward the
enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense.”98 A new rule of
constitutional criminal procedure acquires the “watershed” status
required for it to apply retroactively only when it repairs a systemic and
intolerably grave danger of wrongful conviction.99
Faithful to this restrictive view, the Supreme Court has repeatedly

91. Id. at 313 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 544 (1982) (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(footnotes omitted)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 304, 312–13.
94. Id. at 310–12. Teague also exempted retroactive application of new rules that the Constitution
requires that make “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” Id. at 311 (citation omitted). These substantive rules—
about which crimes are unconstitutionally vague, for example, or which punishments are cruel and
unusual—still apply under Teague when a defendant has exhausted the remedies available to him on
direct review of his case by the time that new rule is announced. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 313–14.
97. Id. at 311 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693). The Court has since
elaborated these kinds of transformative rules must bring about no less than “a profound and
‘sweeping change.’” Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 421 (2007) (quoting Beard v. Banks, 542
U.S. 406, 418 (2004)).
98. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497
U.S. 227, 242 (1990)).
99. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. The watershed doctrine set forth by the plurality was affirmed by a
majority of the Supreme Court later that year in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989).
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maintained that no “new rule . . . falls under this exception” unless it
“alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements” in ways
the Court has “yet to find.”100 The Court clarified this singularly
exacting standard recently in denying watershed status to the Sixth
Amendment suppression of inculpatory testimonial statements by
witnesses that the defendant has not had opportunity to cross-examine.101
According to the Court,
[t]hat a new procedural rule is “fundamental” in some abstract
sense is not enough. Instead, in order to meet this requirement, a
new rule must itself constitute a previously unrecognized
bedrock procedural element that is essential to the fairness of a
proceeding. In applying this requirement, we again have looked
to the example of Gideon, and we have not hesitated to hold that
less sweeping and fundamental rules do not qualify.102
The plurality Justices in Teague did not indicate any new due process
rule that could rise to the bedrock level of Gideon’s right to counsel and
achieve watershed status.103 “We believe it unlikely,” they wrote, that
any such “components of basic due process [will] emerge.”104 True to its
word, in all the years since the watershed exception was established in
1989, the Court has “yet to find a new rule that falls under the second
Teague exception.”105 It has denied watershed status to every one of the
sixteen new rules of constitutional criminal procedure it has considered
within that doctrine.106 Nor has the Court given clues about what, if any,
100. Beard 542 U.S. at 417–18 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 412–13 (discussing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59
(2004)).
102. Id. at 421 (citations omitted) (first quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004);
then quoting Beard, 542 U.S. at 418).
103. The indigent felony defendants’ entitlement to a state-funded attorney under Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), is the rule so central to the “noble ideal” of criminal justice, id. at
344, that Attorney General Robert Kennedy declared that it altered “the whole course of American
legal history,” Robert F. Kennedy, The Department of Justice and the Indigent Accused, 47 J. AM.
JUD. SOC. 182, 182 (1964). See Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 811
(1992).
104. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313; see also Justin F. Marceau, Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482,
2488–89 (2013) (“Gideon, the Court has repeatedly told us, concerns the quintessential example of
a right that safeguards the accuracy and innocence-protecting function of the trial. Indeed, although
Gideon was decided long before the current retroactivity doctrine was announced, the Court has
described Gideon as ‘the only case that th[e] Court has identified as qualifying under this
exception.’ Thus, by relying on Gideon in the abstract—that is, the rhetoric of Gideon as a pillar of
accuracy and fairness—the Court has curtailed the content of other rights in reality.” (alterations in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007)).
105. Beard, 542 U.S. at 417.
106. See Teague, 489 U.S. 288 (declining watershed status to fair-cross section requirement);
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new constitutional rules could ever qualify for retroactive effect.107
Watershed doctrine is a mystery. It enables defendants to seek postconviction relief in the refuge of newly announced constitutional rules
not available to them at the time of their trials and appeals.108 Yet the
Marceau, supra note 104, at 2489–90 (“A range of other rights have come before the Supreme
Court after Teague, and in every single case the Court deemed the right nonretroactive because it
was less important than the accuracy- and innocence-protecting values served by Gideon. Notably,
the Court has even developed a familiar, explicitly Gideon-centered formula for the Teague
analysis: ‘[w]hatever one may think of the importance of [the right in question], it has none of the
primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in Gideon.’”); supra note 15 (citing cases); supra notes
82–85 and accompanying text.
107. In Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008), the Supreme Court clarified that state courts
are free to expand the defendants’ entitlement to retroactive application of changes in constitutional
criminal procedure beyond Teague. Id. at 288–89; see, e.g., State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1136
(Alaska 2009) (“Danforth therefore allows us to apply either the Teague test for full retroactivity or
a state constitutional test so long as the state test is at least as comprehensive as the federal test.”);
Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 470 (Nev. 2002) (“Teague is not controlling on this court, other than
in the minimum constitutional protections established by its two exceptions. In other words, we may
choose to provide broader retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure
than Teague and its progeny require.”). The overwhelming majority of state courts, however, have
decided to decline the invitation and have aligned with Teague. See, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d
61, 65–66 (Idaho 2010) (collecting cases); Lasch, supra note 58, at 42–43 n.306–07 (same). Only
the Alaska, Florida, Michigan, and Missouri supreme courts have adopted the less restrictive
balancing approach of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967). See Smart, 202 P.3d at 1136 (explaining that the Supreme Court identified three criteria
for retroactive application that it borrowed “from those the Supreme Court discussed in Linkletter v.
Walker”); Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 409 (Fla. 2005) (“We continue to apply our
longstanding Witt analysis, which provides more expansive retroactivity standards than those
adopted in Teague.”); People v. Maxson, 759 N.W.2d 817, 822 (Mich. 2008) (reaffirming balancing
test akin to Linkletter–Stovall approach); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo. 2003)
(preferring Linkletter–Stovall approach to Teague). Applications of these alternative approaches are
still influenced, however, by Teague’s constitutional minimum. See Jason Mazzone, Rights and
Remedies in State Habeas Proceedings, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1749, 1763 (2011) (“[E]ven when state
courts take up Danforth’s invitation and depart from Teague, Teague still casts a shadow.”). Every
jurisdiction other than these four outliers has explicitly adopted the Teague approach to watershed
retroactivity for the same reason that forty-two states have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence:
namely, existing federal standards are convenient to adopt and provide safe harbor to protect against
constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Rhoades, 233 P.3d at 69 (“When contrasted with the Linkletter
approach, it is evident that Teague provides a simpler and more predictable test for determining
whether decisions are given retroactive effect. The Teague approach advances an important interest:
the finality of judgments.”); Siers v. Weber, 851 N.W.2d 731, 742 (S.D. 2014) (“By applying the
Teague test for retroactivity, this Court can better address concerns for finality, consistency, and
uniformity—all by way of a simpler, more straightforward test. Moving forward, we therefore adopt
the Teague rule.”).
108. The vindication of the watershed rights requires convicted prisoners to file a timely habeas
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2012). The habeas statute requires them to make a
claim that “relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Any such
petition must be filed within one year from the date “on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(C). The
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Supreme Court’s promise of retrospective protection is improbable by
design. Its demands of Gideon-like fundamental fairness and ultimate
accuracy erect hurdles so high that “it should come as no surprise that
we have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague
exception.”109 What could make sense of a retroactivity doctrine so
superfluous and inoperable that virtually no new rules of constitutional
criminal procedure will ever apply retroactively? Indeed, why have a
watershed doctrine at all?110
II.

THE WATERSHED THREAT EXPLAINED

Constitutional law imposes robust limits on police searches, seizures,
arrests, and interrogations.111 These limits include the right to silence,112
Miranda warnings,113 protection of bodily privacy and integrity against
unreasonable intrusions,114 and the probable cause115 and “reasonable
suspicion” requirement for stops and pat-down searches of suspects.116
For criminal trials, constitutional law sets up an equally solid structural
protection of defendants that entitles them to have an attorney,117 be
prosecuted only once for the same offense,118 be tried by impartial
limitations period starts running from the date on which the Supreme Court initially recognized the
new constitutional right rather than from the date on which the right became applicable
retroactively. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357–59 (2005). Attorneys should thus stay
apprised of new developments in constitutional criminal procedure, bearing in mind the statutory
limitation on successive habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). See Tyler v. Cain, 533
U.S. 656, 662–64 (2001) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) as prohibiting successive habeas
petitions that rely on a new rule of constitutional law not expressly identified as a “watershed” by
the Supreme Court). We thank Catherine Struve for drawing our attention to these limitations.
109. Beard, 542 U.S. at 417.
110. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 46, at 1817 (“Equally troubling is the narrowness of the
exceptions to Teague’s rule barring consideration of new law claims. The first of these—for new
constitutional decisions immunizing primary conduct—is unexceptionable. But the Court’s stringent
limitation of the second exception to rules that both implicate concerns of fundamental fairness and
benefit the innocent restricts federal habeas corpus more sharply than would any of the leading
models. Indeed, it requires simultaneous satisfaction of the kinds of standards that both the
‘innocence matters’ and the ‘process’ views would impose.”); supra notes 26–28 (citing sources).
111. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, §§ 2.1–2.3, at 53–60 (describing constitutionalization of
criminal procedure).
112. Id. § 6.5, at 366–67 (outlining suspect’s right to silence during an interrogation).
113. Id. at 367–69 (outlining Miranda rules).
114. Id. § 3.5, at 205–14 (specifying bodily integrity and privacy protections against unreasonable
searches).
115. Id. § 3.3, at 163–81 (detailing probable cause requirements).
116. Id. § 3.8, at 239–54 (specifying “reasonable suspicion” requirement for stops and frisks).
117. Id. § 11.1, at 579–83 (outlining defendants’ right to counsel).
118. Id. § 25.1, at 1201–14 (specifying defendants’ protection against double jeopardy).
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jurors,119 see the prosecution’s evidence before trial,120 call witnesses,121
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses,122 and choose not to testify.123
In stark contrast to these protections before and during trial,
constitutional law does very little to secure the accuracy of convictions
after trial.124 It merely requires that guilt be proven “beyond a reasonable
doubt”125 and that government does not deliberately try to convict an
innocent person.126 The Supreme Court has done very little to translate
these “due process” requirements into specific accuracy promoting
rules.127 For example, it has set no express constitutional prerequisites
for convicting defendants based on potentially unreliable or prejudicial
evidence like visual identifications, prior crimes, accomplice testimony,
confessions, and forensic statistics.128 Nor has it formulated
constitutional standards for the kinds of evidence that prosecutors can
use at sentencing hearings.129
This undersupply of constitutional norms has an easy explanation.
The one Supreme Court, with just nine Justices who sit for nine months
before summer, hears just about eighty cases a year.130 The myriad
questions of constitutional criminal procedure that await authoritative
decree take up a small proportion of the Court’s docket. Accordingly,
the Court is able to scrutinize only a relatively insignificant—and
consequently unrepresentative—fraction of state court decisions that
convict and punish criminal defendants. Under these constraints, the
Court cannot rigorously regulate the accuracy and fairness of guilty
119. Id. § 22.1, at 1068–70 (outlining defendants’ right to trial by jury).
120. Id. § 20.1, at 953–58; id. § 24.3, at 1143–54 (detailing defendant rights to pretrial discovery
of information).
121. Id. § 24.3, at 1155–57 (outlining defendants’ right to call witnesses and present evidence).
122. Id. § 24.4, at 1159–61 (outlining defendants’ right to cross examine prosecution witnesses).
123. Id. § 24.5, at 1161–66 (outlining defendants’ right not to testify).
124. See Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 86–91 (2008)
(discussing general absence of constitutional standards for evidence selection).
125. Id. at 83–84.
126. Id. at 87–89.
127. Id. at 86–90.
128. Id. at 90–91.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Umaña, 750 F.3d 320, 346–48 (4th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc
denied, 762 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that defendants’ Sixth Amendment protection against
inculpatory testimonial hearsay applies only at trial and does not apply in sentencing proceedings,
even in capital cases).
130. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES—CASES ON DOCKET, DISPOSED OF, AND
REMAINING ON DOCKET 1 tbl.A-1 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/A01Sep13.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2GZ-CWVB].
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verdicts. All it can do is impose structural limits on the criminal trial and
police powers. And so this is just what it did.
The Supreme Court has set forth only two “due process” mandates
that enhance accuracy of convictions: it ruled that the prosecution must
prove all elements of the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt;131
and it also enjoined the government from knowingly relying on false or
manufactured inculpatory evidence.132 These precedents are
monumental. Yet, they tell just part of our constitutional criminal
procedure story. The Court has supplemented these precedents with two
residual rulings on constitutional criminal procedure to which casebooks
and articles give short shrift. First, constitutional “due process” is an
open-ended standard that the Court continues to fashion.133 Second, the
Court retains the power to accord watershed status to any new rule of
due process that enhances the accuracy of convictions and fundamental
fairness of trials.134 We now proceed to identify watershed doctrine’s
role in the Supreme Court’s design of constitutional criminal procedure.
This inquiry will illuminate the watershed puzzle.
A.

The Economics of Law Enforcement

Consider a policymaker whose task is to design and implement laws
under severe constraints. The policymaker can formulate but a small
number of legal commands for many diverse activities of any certain
kind; and society’s limited enforcement resources afford just a few
opportunities to implement these commands by comparison to the far
greater incidence of conduct in the real world that those commands
implicate. How can the policymaker operating under such constraints
hope to discourage legal violations? The standard answer is that she can
use the enforcement method that might be called a “magnified sweep.”
Specifically, the policymaker can compensate for the enforcement
deficit by formulating broad standards, as opposed to carefully
articulated rules, and impose harsh penalties on those who violate such
standards.135 This method will deter many violations even when the law131. Stein, supra note 124, at 83–84.
132. Id. at 87–89.
133. Id. at 86 (describing “due process” doctrine as Supreme Court’s “floating threat” to
invalidate state laws); see also Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 350 n.13 (2011) (“[T]he Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may constitute a further bar to admission
of . . . unreliable evidence.”).
134. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
135. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 563–
64 (1992) (explaining benefits of standards); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
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enforcer imposes the harsh penalties only once in a while. The prospect
of paying those penalties will make violations disadvantageous for those
who consider them.136
This enforcement method will not always work properly, however,
because flexible standards are applied unpredictably.137 Actors subject to
an ambiguous standard whose violation triggers harsh penalties will
steer away from any conduct that might fall within the standard’s
scope.138 As a result, actors will forego some socially beneficial
activities that the policymaker does not want to suppress.139 When the
value of those activities exceeds the value of implementing the
policymaker’s commands, the magnified sweep loses appeal as a way of
securing compliance with the law.140 Under such circumstances, the
policymaker must look for other enforcement methods.
One of these is “strategic enforcement.”141 Under this method, the
policymaker openly commits to penalizing only the worst or most
rampant violators of the chosen standard with severe punishment.142 All
other violators go scot-free.143 This strategy forces potential violators
into a cascaded retreat: to avoid being identified as the worst offenders,
and thereby incurring the extreme penalties, every violator will scale
down deviations from the policymaker’s standard.144 Violators will
repeat this correction to readjust their conduct to the lesser deviations of
others, thus bringing the conduct of all into greater conformity with the
policymaker’s standard.145 This enforcement method seeks to avoid the
cost of suppressing socially beneficial activities incurred by the
magnified sweep method.146 However, it will avoid these costs only

Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 180–85 (1968) (explaining benefits of enhanced punishments
when enforcement costs are high).
136. Becker, supra note 135, at 180–85.
137. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 167, 174–75
(2015) (analyzing unpredictability and other vices of standards); John E. Calfee & Richard
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965,
966–67, 981 (1984) (explaining how vague standards chill beneficial conduct).
138. Calfee & Craswell, supra note 137, at 981.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See generally Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9
(2010).
142. Id. at 22–24.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 10–11, 20–21.
145. Id. at 10–11.
146. Id.
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when the measure for worst-violator is clear to all. Both the policymaker
who comes up with the law and the actors who are subject to its
provisions must have a common metric for identifying the severity of
violations.147 Absent such a metric, actors would not be able to identify
the “worst” benchmark from which to scale down their activities.148
Furthermore, because the “strategic enforcement” method utilizes the
tournament mechanism,149 it will also become ineffectual when
prospective violators strike a workable agreement to make their
violations indistinguishable from each other.150
Another method of enforcing the policymaker’s commands is called
“dynamic concentration.”151 Like strategic enforcement more generally,
this method relies on an extreme penalty that the policymaker delivers
on rare occasions that involve violation of its standard, while condoning
all other violations.152 Actors can still count on their low probability of
being punished, but here the policymaker takes care to sort punishable
violations under the chosen standard.153 Whereas strategic enforcement
depends on actors’ uncertain knowledge and expectations about each
other’s conduct to avoid being the worst violator, what distinguishes
dynamic concentration is its distinct reliance on sorting deviations from
the standard.154 As under strategic enforcement, here too the
policymaker will impose an extreme penalty sparingly, delivering it only
to those violators who deviate grossly from its chosen standard.155 But
under this dynamic concentration method, an actor need not be
objectively the worst violator to become eligible for that penalty.156
Whether or not he will incur the penalty will depend on the enforcer’s
decision rather than the violators’ tournament-based self-selection.157
B.

The Dynamic Concentration Model
In light of the Supreme Court’s enforcement constraints, which of

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 11, 26.
Id.
Id. at 21 & n.37.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See KLEIMAN, supra note 35, at 49–65; supra note 37 (citing sources).
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these three methods is best suited to implement its vision of fair trial? As
we mentioned earlier, this vision encompasses not only the express “due
process” precedents that the Court had managed to work out, but also—
indeed, primarily—the implications of those precedents that it has not
yet been able to articulate. Assuming that the Court is interested in
seeing its constitutional protections against wrongful convictions
implemented, how should it incentivize uncooperative state courts to
realize its vision of fair trial, as opposed to theirs? Should it use the
magnified sweep, strategic enforcement, or dynamic concentration to
ensure that state processes for policing and prosecution satisfy
constitutional obligations? What would these methods look like in the
present context?
Begin with the magnified sweep. Under this method, broad standards
promulgated by the Court encompass open-ended norms of due
process.158 Correspondingly, the repercussions the Court would use to
respond to norm violations would include the quashing of convictions.
This enforcement method suffers from two intractable problems:
implementation costs and over deterrence. An underspecified due
process standard would require reviewing a number of cases that well
exceeds the Court’s working capacity. This overextension would make it
impossible for the Court to implement its vision of fair trial in practice.
Worse, the Court’s decisions to grant certiorari to certain petitions but
not hear cases brought by other similarly situated defendants would
often be unprincipled or outright arbitrary.159 Furthermore, in order to
avoid having their guilty verdicts reversed, state courts would have to
systematically expand defendants’ due process rights. Some of these
expansions would afford defendants rights beyond those protections that
the standard was designed to cover. This prophylactic tendency would
also expand the scope of constitutional due process to many guilty
defendants whom the courts would be forced to acquit.
The Supreme Court would fare no better using strategic enforcement.
This method’s implementation would face two different problems. First,
as we already noted, “due process” embodies too many different kinds of
trial norms to hope to specify a meaningful portion in advance. Ranking
the relative severity of state courts’ departures from those norms is even
more difficult, if not impossible. Thus, there is no objective metric the
Court can use to identify the worst violations of due process. Nor is there
any clear or uniform metric state courts can use to steer away from the

158. See supra note 135.
159. Cf. supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.

06 - Fox & Stein.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

5/30/2016 3:50 PM

WATERSHEDS

489

“worst violation” zone. Moreover, strategic enforcement would also
incentivize state courts to copy each other’s decisions in a way that
makes it difficult for the Supreme Court to sort among them in order to
identify the worst violators.160
All this leaves the Court with only one viable option: the “dynamic
concentration” method. The Court needs to formulate an aggressive
penalty for state courts that deviate from its vision of fair trial, which it
will impose only under extreme circumstances unidentified in advance.
The best penalty that comes to mind here is watershed: the reversal of all
guilty verdicts preceded by a trial that grossly deviates from the Court’s
understanding of due process. State courts will not ignore this penalty. It
may instead give them a reason to project the Supreme Court’s vision of
fair trial and align their decisions with that vision.
State courts cannot afford massive reopening of criminal convictions
followed by acquittals of defendants some, if not many, of whom are
factually guilty. Because state judges risk paying with their careers and
prestige if they allow it to happen, they may try to eliminate the
watershed’s probability, however low it may be.161 The best way to do
so is to align the state’s criminal procedures with the Supreme Court’s
understanding of due process. To secure this alignment, state courts
would not only comply with the settled constitutional precedents but
would also try to predict the directions those precedents might take in
the future. We estimate that some of these projections will overprotect
criminal defendants’ due process rights, but not to the same degree as
under the magnified sweep. This process will operate in a way that tends
to secure the functionality and uniformity of our constitutional criminal
procedure.
To see how dynamic concentration unfolds here, consider a state
court that anticipates the expansion of defendants’ Sixth Amendment
protection against ineffective assistance of counsel.162 Specifically, the
state court believes that the Supreme Court will categorize a defense
counsel’s failure to raise an objection against inadmissible inculpatory
evidence as ineffective assistance.163 Moreover, because defendants’
160. Cf. Victoria A. Saker, Federalism, The Great Writ, and Extrajudicial Politics: The
Conference of Chief Justices, 1949–1966, in FEDERALISM AND THE JUDICIAL MIND: ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 131, 131 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1992)
(discussing an organization of state chief judges formed in 1949 to wage “a 15-year crusade to trim
the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts”).
161. See infra notes 172–73173 and accompanying text.
162. See Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (expanding defendants’ Sixth
Amendment protection against ineffective assistance of counsel to plea bargains).
163. For the current state of the law, see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384–85 (1986)
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protection against ineffective assistance of counsel is arguably as
important as their right to counsel under Gideon, there is a chance that
the Supreme Court will declare that new protection a watershed.164
These projections suggest that the lower court will best serve its
reputational interests and criminal justice if it establishes a rule
expanding the definition of “ineffective assistance” to include a defense
attorney’s failure to object to inadmissible inculpatory evidence. Failure
to create such a rule would pile up the number of convicted defendants
whose attorneys did not make the requisite objections. The Supreme
Court’s subsequent holding that the ineffective assistance doctrine
protects such defendants as a watershed would lead to their mass
exoneration and release. Under this scenario, the state court would face
public accusations of institutional failure that kept innocent defendants
in jail and guilty ones from being retried under constitutional procedures
after their convictions have been quashed.165 These accusations would
damage not only the court’s reputation, but also confidence in the state’s
criminal justice system as a whole. While the state court might try to
shift the blame to the United States Supreme Court’s pro-defendant
policies, it is hard to tell how convincing the state court’s constituents
would find that excuse. Forestalling the watershed threat by expanding
defendants’ protection against ineffective assistance is the state court’s
safer strategy. Because the damage to its reputation would be substantial,
even irreparable, this strategy may prevail even when that threat’s
probability is very low.
This justification of watershed doctrine is theoretical rather than
empirical. We argue that it helps explain why the doctrine works the
way it does.166 Dynamic concentration theory uncovers the important
(“failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel”;
yet, when an attorney fails “to file a timely suppression motion, not due to strategic considerations”
but because he is unprepared, he will deny the defendant effective assistance); United States v.
Rogers, 41 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to object to evidence
of the defendant’s prior crimes did not constitute ineffective assistance); Mason v. Scully, 16 F.3d
38, 44 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to object to nontestifying codefendant’s
hearsay statement that clearly violated the Confrontation Clause constituted ineffective assistance);
Comer v. Parratt, 674 F.2d 734, 736 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to object
to incriminating statements induced by questionable police methods was a tactical decision not
violating the customary skill-and-diligence standard).
164. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court clearly regards the
protection against ineffective assistance as a bedrock principle of due process. See infra note 221
and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (emphasizing criminal defendant’s interest in
the double-jeopardy context in the finality of an acquittal).
166. Cf. Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 349–56 (2007)

06 - Fox & Stein.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

5/30/2016 3:50 PM

WATERSHEDS

491

role that watersheds have in constitutional design. Our claim is not that
the Supreme Court had this justification in mind when it decided Teague
v. Lane or other watershed cases. Nor is it that state courts are uniformly
inimical to protecting the rights of criminal defendants or institutionally
opposed to the Supreme Court’s vision of fair trial. Indeed, some of
those courts have interpreted their state constitutions to afford robust
protections against erroneous conviction167 and open fruitful
constitutional dialogue with the Supreme Court.168 State courts still have
powerful incentives, however, to serve the majoritarian interest in
convicting and punishing as many guilty criminals as it can even when it
erodes innocent defendants’ protection against wrongful conviction.169
The watershed doctrine counteracts this pernicious motivation.
III.

STATE COURT DECISIONS: 1989–2015

Does the watershed threat influence state court decisions in the way
our theory predicts? Does it actually motivate judges to afford
procedural rights to criminal defendants whose convictions have become
final? These empirical questions are undeniably important, but we are
unable to give them a direct answer. Answering these questions directly
would require impracticably close study of the many thousands of
appellate decisions that implicate criminal procedure across all state
courts. An alternative might be to sample those decisions in a reliable
way. This strategy will not work either because “fair trial” norms
embody an exceedingly large variety of factors that play greater and
smaller roles across very different decisions. Which among those
decisions are “representative” and which are not is accordingly very
difficult, if not impossible, to tell.
For these reasons, we decided to focus on a more modest question: do
state courts take watersheds seriously? To answer this question, we
comprehensively examined every state court decision that addressed the

(explaining that valid explanatory theories of judge-made rules need to uncover contextual
convergence between judges’ decisions and social good, and need not match judges’ stated and
unstated intents).
167. See Stein, supra note 124, at 116–19 (identifying and discussing state courts’ policies
overprotective of defendants’ rights).
168. Id. at 116 (observing that, at times, “the Supreme Court and state courts do not simply divide
rule-making power [in the field of evidence and procedure]. Rather, they share constitutional
governance through coordination and dialogue in the atmosphere of mutual respect”). See generally
Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
169. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
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retroactivity of constitutional criminal procedure rules in the twenty-six
years since Teague.170 Our study was qualitative. We closely analyzed
the holdings and logic of 358 state court decisions that invoked
watershed doctrine to determine whether the courts’ grants and denials
of retroactivity rights embody commitment to the level of due process
set by the United States Supreme Court. We found that state courts’
watershed decisions exceed this baseline.
A.

“Looking into the Crystal Ball”

Our analysis of state courts’ watershed decisions sheds new light on a
critical dynamic in constitutional criminal procedure. The expansion of
due process rights for criminal defendants takes a high toll on state
courts. By and large, state judges owe their jobs and prestige to election
by voters.171 That voters tend to value crime prevention more than
defendants’ rights incentivizes state courts to cater to these punitive
preferences.172 The dynamic concentration model predicts that the
watershed threat mitigates this incentive. This theory anticipates that
state courts would heed watersheds for two reasons. Because state courts
care about their reputation, they would try to protect it against the
Supreme Court’s rulings that publicly reverse their precedents.173 More
crucially, as noted earlier, state courts cannot afford institutional failures

170. Federal courts deal with watersheds too, but we excluded their dispositions from our study
for two reasons. First, federal judges are appointed and not elected, and so do not face the same
punitive motivations that state judges do. Second, federal judges answer only to the Supreme Court
that determines federal rules and hears federal appeals. So they have very different reasons to avoid
reversals and the reputational damage incurred within the federal system. Accordingly, federal
courts perform a largely ministerial role under watershed doctrine. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S.
LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 25.4, at 743–50 (2d. ed. 1994);
cf. Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (clarifying that “AEDPA and Teague inquiries are
distinct” such that “a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a threshold Teague
analysis when the issue is properly raised by the state”).
171. See, e.g., G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES 70 (2012) (noting that “nine states selected their state
supreme court justices in partisan elections, thirteen in nonpartisan elections, and fifteen through a
system of merit selection in which justices run in retention elections after their initial appointment”).
172. See generally Alma Cohen et al., Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation
Approach, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S133 (2015) (demonstrating that elected state judges try to cater to
voters’ preferences).
173. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 586–87 (8th ed. 2011)
(arguing that judges tend to be highly sensitive to having their decisions reversed by a higher court);
Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1259, 1271 (2005) (observing that judges care about their reputation and “do not like to be
reversed, even though a reversal has no tangible effect on a judge’s career if he is unlikely to be
promoted”).
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that publicly discredit their ability to determine guilt and innocence.
State courts are also interested in insulating their states’ systems of
criminal procedure against interventions, criticism, and dictates from
outside. State courts have several reasons to expand retroactivity rights.
Those reasons include the following: avoiding wholesale reopening of
criminal convictions for retrial, avoiding release or resentencing on
conditions imposed by the Supreme Court, and fending off accusations
portraying the judges as oblivious to the plight of arguably innocent
defendants. All of these reasons could encourage state courts to apply
the new rules of criminal procedure with more frequency than they did
under Teague. This preemptive strategy allows state courts to exercise
greater control over their systems of criminal procedure and protect their
stature and reputation.
State courts thus account for the possibility a new rule might become
a watershed. They do so when they cite in support of granting watershed
retroactivity preemptively that the Supreme Court, though it has never
granted watershed status itself, referred to a new rule in dicta as a
“bedrock principle,”174 or “tells us we deal with ‘constitutional
protections of surpassing importance.’”175 Indeed, some state courts
credited their watershed conferral—explicitly—to what, “[l]ooking into
the crystal ball[,] . . . we think that the Supreme Court will hold” in the
future.176 These references suggest that the watershed threat is a credible
one despite its low probability.
The original analysis here identified 358 state court decisions that
mention “watershed” rules over the twenty-six-year period between
February 22, 1989, when Teague was decided, through July 31, 2015.
From this initial sample, we set aside decisions in which “the issue of
retroactive application” was “unnecessary to the determination of an
appeal” because “failure to apply [the rule] would constitute only
harmless error.”177 This study also left out cases in which the rule at
issue had been announced before the underlying conviction was final,
thus making watershed analysis irrelevant,178 and those that considered

174. People v. Encarnacion, No. 5804/95, 2005 WL 433252, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 2005)
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004)).
175. People v. Beachem, 740 N.E.2d 389, 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (quoting Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475 (2000)).
176. Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
177. Clark v. State, 2001 ND 9, ¶ 9, 621 N.W.2d 576, 579.
178. See, e.g., People v. McDade, 836 N.W.2d 266, 275–276 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013); O’Meara v.
State, 679 N.W.2d 334, 339–40 (Minn. 2004); State v. Elmore, 2009 Ohio 3478, ¶¶ 25–28, 912
N.E.2d 582, 589–90.
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watershed retroactivity in a concurrence or dissent, but not in a majority
opinion.179 To avoid double-counting, omitted from the final list were all
retroactivity decisions that had been preceded by an earlier court ruling
within the same state.180 Among these overlaps were sixteen cases that
granted watershed retroactivity.181 Where the earlier state decision was
not binding, the ultimate figures were made conservative by excluding
just grants of watershed status, but not denials.
This analysis of the remaining 228 watershed cases reveals a
considerable proportion—27 decisions, one in every nine—that inflate
Supreme Court doctrine by retroactively apply new procedural rules in
ways that manifestly diminish Teague’s exacting requirements.182 The
Court has made clear that due process retroactivity is only appropriate in
the “extremely narrow” class of rules that enhance both the fairness of
criminal trials and the accuracy of guilty verdicts as profoundly as
Gideon’s guarantee of counsel.183 The Court has indeed rejected “every
claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status.”184
Faithful implementation of watershed doctrine thus demands denying
retroactive application to virtually every newly announced rule of
constitutional criminal procedure.185 Yet, more than one in nine

179. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 93 P.3d 1076, 1083–84 (Ariz. 2004) (Jones, C.J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); Monlyn v. State, 894 So. 2d 832, 840 (Fla. 2004) (Cantero, J., concurring);
Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343, 354–55 (Pa. 2012) (Castille, C.J., concurring); Swazo v.
State, 800 P.2d 1152, 1153–54 & n.4 (Wyo. 1990) (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting).
180. See, e.g., Kriebel v. State, 219 P.3d 1204, 1207 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009); Oken v. State, 786
A.2d 691, 694 (Md. 2001); Commonwealth v. Reed, 2014 PA Super 280, 8, 107 A.3d 137, 141.
181. See infra app., tbl. 2.
182. Compare infra app., tbl.1, with infra app., tbl.3.
183. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007).
184. Id.
185. Counted as alignments with Teague were cases that declined a rule’s retroactive application
despite expanding watershed doctrine. This happens when a court, while refusing retroactivity in a
particular case, loosens the strictures of the watershed test relative to Teague in a way that makes it
easier for subsequent courts to find a new rule retroactive under that relaxed standard. For example,
the Nevada Supreme Court in Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 (Nev. 2002), declined to apply
retroactively the procedural rule that jurors and not judges must find the facts required to impose a
sentence of death. Id. at 474 (applying retroactivity doctrine to the rule the Supreme Court set forth
in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)); see also id. at 473 (“[W]e believe it is clear that Ring is
based simply on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, not on a perceived need to enhance
accuracy in capital sentencings, and does not throw into doubt the accuracy of death sentences
handed down by three-judge panels in this state.”). That court explicitly declined to recognize any
fairness requirement for new procedural rules on collateral review, making clear that “if accuracy is
seriously diminished without the rule, the rule is significant enough to warrant retroactive
application.” Id. at 472. If that rule “establish[ed] a procedure without which the likelihood of an
accurate conviction is seriously diminished,” the court explained, “then the rule applies”
retroactively, whether or not, as Teague requires, it implicates the fundamental fairness of criminal
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watershed decisions by state courts enlarge the scope of defendants’
retroactivity rights. These decisions have backdated fourteen new
rules—eleven announced by the United States Supreme Court under the
federal Constitution and three by state supreme courts under their
respective state constitutions.186 And not a single watershed decision has
refused retroactive effect to a due process rule that would be afforded
that status under Teague.187 In light of state courts’ punitive pressures,
trials: “we do not distinguish a separate requirement of ‘bedrock’ or ‘watershed’ significance.” Id.
This kind of decision, while denying retroactivity to the rule under consideration in the immediate
case, tends to expand the meaning of “watersheds.” These cases did not, nonetheless, count as
inflations of the watershed doctrine under our analysis.
186. See, e.g., Acra v. State, 105 So. 3d 460, 466–67 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (applying
retroactively the new rule announced in State v. Adams, 91 So. 3d 724 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010),
barring requirement that sex offenders provide address at which they would reside following release
from prison); In re Gomez, 199 P.3d 574, 577 (Cal. 2009) (declaring watershed the due process rule
announced in Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007), which barred the imposition of an
upper term sentence under sentencing scheme based on judicial fact-finding); People v. Williams,
2012 IL App (1st) 111145, ¶¶ 52–55, 982 N.E.2d 181, 197–98 (declaring watershed the new rule
announced in Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which barred sentencing
policies that mandate, for juvenile homicide offenders, a punishment of life in prison without the
possibility of parole); People v. Rush, 757 N.E.2d 88, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (declaring watershed
the new due process rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which
required that any fact except for recidivism that increases a defendant’s statutory maximum
sentence must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt), vacated, 796 N.E.2d 1048 (Ill. 2003);
People v. De Jesus, No. 10335/98, 2010 WL 5300535, *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2010) (declaring
watershed the new due process rule announced in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), which
required that criminal defense attorneys must advise non-citizen clients about the deportation risks
of a guilty plea); People v. Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897, 900–02 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (declaring watershed
the new due process rule announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004), which
forbid the admission of statements by declarants who did not testify at trial); State v. Whitfield, 107
S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (declaring watershed the new due process rule announced in
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which required a jury to find the aggravating factors
necessary for imposing the death penalty); Ramirez v. State, 2014-NMSC-023, ¶ 2, 333 P.3d 240,
246 (declaring watershed the new due process rule announced in State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799
(N.M. 2004), which required attorneys to advise noncitizen clients of the immigration consequences
of guilty pleas); State v. Zuniga, 444 S.E.2d 443, 446–47 (N.C. 1994) (declaring watershed the new
due process rules announced in both Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), which forbid holdout
juror from prevent the others from considering mitigating evidence, and McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433 (1990), which barred a sentencing scheme that made it likely jurors would think
unanimity required for them to consider any particular circumstance as mitigating); Talley v. State,
640 S.E.2d 878, 882 (S.C. 2007) (declaring watershed the new due process rule announced in
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), which extended right to counsel to defendants who
received suspended sentences); Darden v. State, No. M2013-01328-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 992097,
at *9–10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2014) (declaring watershed the new due process rule
announced in Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 811 (Tenn. 2001), which prohibited the execution
of intellectually disabled defendants); Brewer v. State, No. 1179, 1991 WL 21605, at *4 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Feb. 22, 1991) (declaring watershed the new due process rule announced in Sandstrom
v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), which barred jury instructions creating a presumption of malice
that has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant).
187. We would have counted as inappropriate refusals for example, a state’s constitutional rule of
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this expansion of defendants’ retroactivity protections confirms our
theory that state courts try to align their criminal procedure decisions
with their projection of the Supreme Court’s vision of fair trial.
B.

Crawford and Miller

A couple examples help illustrate the ways that state courts respond to
the watershed threat given uncertainty about whether the Supreme Court
will backdate a new due process rule. Consider the expansion of
defendants’ confrontation rights in Crawford v. Washington.188
Crawford barred the admission of testimonial inculpatory statements
made by declarants not available for cross-examination.189 Federal courts
have overwhelmingly refused to apply that rule to finalized
convictions.190 Their view has received the Supreme Court’s approval in
the Whorton v. Bockting191 decision that denied watershed status to
Crawford. Prior to Bockting, however, multiple state courts have
declared the rule a watershed.192 For instance, in People v. Watson,193 the
New York supreme court held that the defendant was entitled to
retroactive application of Crawford.194 Emphasizing the presumptive
criminal procedure that, like Gideon, expanded access to the guarantee of counsel in serious cases.
188. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
189. Id. at 54.
190. See, e.g., Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 867 (7th Cir. 2005); Murillo v. Frank, 402 F.3d
786, 790 (7th Cir. 2005); Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005); Mungo v. Duncan,
393 F.3d 327, 335–36 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 2004).
But see Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Whorton v.
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
191. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419 (“In Gideon, the only case that we have identified as
qualifying under this exception, the Court held that counsel must be appointed for any indigent
defendant charged with a felony. When a defendant who wishes to be represented by counsel is
denied representation, Gideon held, the risk of an unreliable verdict is intolerably high. The new
rule announced in Gideon eliminated this risk. The Crawford rule is in no way comparable to the
Gideon rule. The Crawford rule is much more limited in scope, and the relationship of that rule to
the accuracy of the factfinding process is far less direct and profound.” (citations omitted)); id. at
422 (“[T]he rule announced in Crawford, while certainly important, is not in the same category with
Gideon. Gideon effected a profound and ‘sweeping’ change. The Crawford rule simply lacks the
‘primacy’ and ‘centrality’ of the Gideon rule, and does not qualify as a rule that “alter[ed] our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.”
(citations omitted)).
192. See People v. Encarnacion, No. 5804/95, 2005 WL 433252, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23,
2005) (“The Crawford decision altered a bedrock procedural element of constitutional criminal
procedure.”); People v. Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897, 905 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that the new
Crawford rule “involves the same ‘bedrock procedural element which implicates the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the trial’”).
193. 827 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
194. Id. at 826–35 (discussing retroactive application of the rule announced in Crawford).
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unreliability of testimonial hearsay195 and “unique, and essential, role
that cross-examination plays in the fact-finding process,”196 the state
court categorized the confrontation requirement as “one of the
exceedingly few new rules of constitutional criminal procedure
which . . . must be applied retroactively to cases which have already
become final.”197 That state court nowhere addressed whether this
requirement rose to the magnitude of Gideon. Nor did it explain how
Crawford “alter[ed] our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding.”198
A more recent example is the important new rule that the Supreme
Court announced in Miller v. Alabama.199 This constitutional rule bans
sentencing schemes that require life in prison without the possibility of
parole for juvenile homicide offenders.200 The Court ruled that the
Eighth Amendment entitles any such offender to an individualized
sentencing hearing that will determine his eligibility to life without
parole.201 There is a strong moral argument why Miller should apply
retroactively. If it does not, thousands of prisoners currently serving a
sentence of life without parole for crimes they committed as juveniles
will spend the overwhelming part of their lives behind bars without ever
having had consideration of any individual factors that might mitigate in
favor of at least the possibility of parole before death.202 A defendant
whose finalized conviction took place under a system that mandated the
most severe punishment imposable on a juvenile was indeed “denied a
‘basic precept of justice,’” as one court put it, “by not [affording] any
consideration of his age from the circuit court in sentencing.”203
195. Id. at 834 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
196. Id. at 833.
197. Id. at 832.
198. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1226–27
(10th Cir. 2004); People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118, 1123 (Colo. App. 2004); Kriebel v. State, 219
P.3d 1204, 1207 (Idaho 2009).
199. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
200. Id. at 2463–75.
201. Id.
202. See Elizabeth Calvin, “When I Die . . . They’ll Send Me Home”: Youth Sentenced to Life in
Prison Without Parole in California, an Update, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/node/105473/section/2 [https://perma.cc/FR4X-KNNZ] (estimating that as of
January 2008, 2570 people nationwide were serving life without parole sentences for crimes they
committed as minors).
203. People v. Williams, 982 N.E.2d 181, 196–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); cf. Hill v. Snyder, No. 1014568, 2013 WL 364198, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013) (“[I]f ever there was a legal rule that
should—as a matter of law and morality—be given retroactive effect, it is the rule announced in
Miller. To hold otherwise would allow the state to impose unconstitutional punishment on some
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This compelling moral argument helps to explain the Supreme
Court’s decision to make Miller retroactive in Montgomery v.
Louisiana.204 But it does not bring Miller close to Gideon.205 In Miller,
the Court made clear that its “decision does not categorically bar a
penalty” of life without parole for a juvenile or add a new element the
state must prove before issuing such punishments: “it mandates only that
a sentencer follow a certain process . . . before imposing [that]
penalty.”206 Miller “merely shifts ‘decisionmaking authority’ [from the
legislature to the judiciary] for the imposition of a life-without-parole
sentence on a juvenile homicide offender.”207 This focus on sentencing
does not implicate the accuracy of conviction.208 Nor does requiring
individualized sentencing for juvenile offenders confronting life without
parole prohibit that punishment for minors.209 All it does is “[alter] the
permissible methods by which the State can exercise its continuing
power to punish juvenile homicide offenders by life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.”210 This constitutional reform obligated
states only to change the means in which they issue the very same
penalty that most jurisdictions had already been imposing.211 For these
reasons, Miller is far from being as constitutionally significant as
Gideon’s benchmark guarantee of counsel to the indigent.
Nonetheless, nineteen state courts had, prior to Montgomery, applied
Miller retroactively and vacated final sentences on collateral review.212
persons but not others, an intolerable miscarriage of justice.”).
204. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); see supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
205. See State v. Tate, 2012-2763, p. 16–17 (La. 11/5/13); 130 So. 3d 829, 841 (holding that
Miller is not a watershed rule), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014), abrogated by Montgomery v.
Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Commonwealth v. Reed, 2014 PA Super 280, 10, 107
A.3d 137, 143 (same).
206. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (emphasis added).
207. People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 826 (Mich. 2014); see also id. at 821–32 (explaining why
the Miller rule is procedural not substantive).
208. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 183 So. 3d 198, 214–16 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014).
209. See, e.g., Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375, 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Huntley,
2013-127, p. 12–13 (La. App. 3 Cir. 7/10/13); 118 So. 3d 95, 103; see also supra notes 21–22 and
accompanying text.
210. Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328–30 (Minn. 2013).
211. See id. at 329–31; State v. Tate, 2012-2763, p. 16–17 (La. 9/5/13); 130 So. 3d 829, 841, cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014), abrogated by Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718
(2016); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013).
212. See In re Wilson, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 790–91 (Ct. App. 2015), superseded by 346 P.3d 26
(Cal. 2015); In re Willover, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 156 (Ct. App. 2015), superseded by 351 P.3d
328 (Cal. 2015); Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1037, 1042–43 (Conn. 2015), cert.
denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, 136 S. Ct. 1364 (2016); People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 39,
6 N.E.3d 709, 722; People v. Arrieta, 2014 IL App (2d) 130035-U, ¶ 15; People v. Luciano, 2013 IL
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App (2d) 110792, ¶ 53–62, 988 N.E.2d 943, 953–59; People v. Johnson, 2013 IL App (5th) 110112,
¶ 22, 998 N.E.2d 185, 195; State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115–17 (Iowa 2013); State v.
Simmons, 2011-1810, p.1–2 (La. 10/12/12); 99 So. 3d 28, 28 (per curiam); Diatchenko v. Dist.
Atty. for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013); Commonwealth v. Halbert, No. 198814286, 2013 WL 5529328, at *2–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 16, 2013); Jones v. State, 2009-CT02033-SCT (¶ 18) (Miss. 2013), 122 So. 3d 698, 703; Branch v. Cassady, No. WD 77788, 2015 WL
160718, at *8–9 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2015), cause ordered transferred to Mo. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 31,
2015); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb.), cert. denied Nebraska v. Mantich, 135 S. Ct.
67 (2014); Petition of State of N.H., 103 A.3d 227, 236 (N.H. 2014); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d
572, 575 (S.C. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2379 (2015); Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 68
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). All but two of these decisions have strained to avoid reaching the
watershed question at all. The exceptions are Casiano, 115 A.3d at 1037, 1042–43, and People v.
Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 111145, ¶ 56, 982 N.E.2d 181, 197–98. The other seventeen all
recharacterize the Miller rule as more substantive than it is procedural, and accordingly applicable
on collateral review without resort to any determination of its watershed status. See, e.g., Arrieta,
2014 IL App (2d) 130035-U, ¶ 14–15 (noting that the court “continue[s] to find [the] reasoning
sound” in its earlier determination, and that it does “not need to address whether [Miller] also fell
into the second exception”); Luciano, 2013 IL App (2d) 110792, ¶¶ 60–63(noting that “a different
panel of the First District Appellate Court determined that Miller in fact stated a watershed rule of
criminal procedure sufficient to qualify under the second Teague exception” but “express[ing] no
opinion” about that holding or “the merits of the State’s arguments regarding the second Teague
exception”); Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 731; Aiken, 765 S.E.2d at 575 (explaining that “[w]e need not
consider whether Miller’s holding constitutes a watershed rule because we find it is substantive and
thus meets Teague’s first exception”). That the Supreme Court reinforced this mischaracterization
of that rule as “substantive” in Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 723 (2016),
does not change things. See supra notes 5–8, 19–25. These Miller cases were counted as inflations
of Teague because they backdated Miller under conditions of uncertainty about the watershed
threat. They misclassified that procedural rule as “substantive” for reasons given above. See supra
notes 207–19212 and accompanying text. That the Supreme Court has formulated retroactivity
rights as extending to rules of “primary, private individual conduct” makes it clear that these
“backdoor watersheds” defy Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989). By contrast, counted as
alignments with Teague were many other cases from the initial sample that granted retroactivity
rights based on the genuinely substantive, as opposed to procedural, nature of the rule in question.
See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 925 So. 2d 245, 253 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (retroactively applying the
new rule announced in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which prohibited the execution of
offenders who were juveniles when their crimes were committed); Charles v. State, 287 P.3d 779
(Alaska App. 2012) (granting retroactive application to the new state rule announced in Doe v.
State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008), which held that the requirements of the sex offender registration
act constitute “punishment” for purposes of the state constitutional ex post facto clause); Jacobs v.
State, 835 N.E.2d 485, 488–90 (Ind. 2005) (applying retroactively the new rule announced in Ross
v. State, 729 N.E.2d 113 (Ind. 2000), which prohibited double enhancement of misdemeanor
handgun violations by virtue of prior convictions and habitual offender classification); State v.
Whitehorn, 2002 MT 54, ¶ 42, 50 P.3d 121, 129 (applying retroactively the new substantive rule
announced in State v. Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, 975 P.2d 312 (1999), which held that application of
weapons enhancement statute to a felony offense requiring use of a weapon violated state
constitutional protection against double jeopardy). A good illustration is the rule announced in
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which bars the execution of mentally retarded persons.
Atkins set forth a substantive rule that regulates, as Teague put it, “certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,” rather than
a procedural one that regulates, in just the way that Miller does, “the manner of determining the
defendant’s culpability.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 307. For Teague-aligning cases that backdate the
Atkins rule as substantive rather than procedural, see Clemons v. State, 55 So. 3d 314, 319–20 (Ala.
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The Connecticut Supreme Court held precisely as the United States
Supreme Court ought to have in Montgomery, namely, “that the rule
announced in Miller is a watershed rule of criminal procedure that must
be applied retroactively.”213 That state Court acknowledged that “the
United States Supreme Court has narrowly construed this second
exception and, in the twenty-six years since Teague was decided, has yet
to conclude that a new rule qualifies as watershed.”214 That Miller
focuses “on the process by which juveniles can be sentenced to life
without parole” led the court to reason that “Miller announced a
procedural rule.”215 This much is uncontroversial. More difficult to
understand is how its citation to a dissenting opinion supports its
inference that “the individualized sentencing prescribed by Miller is
‘central to an accurate determination’” under Teague.216 It is true that
“failing to consider youth and its attendant characteristics creates a risk
of disproportionate punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.”217
But this does not prove the necessary conclusion that Miller “implicates
the fundamental fairness of a juvenile sentencing” tantamount to
Gideon.218
What could explain why so many state courts have relaxed the
watershed doctrine?219 The data can be interpreted in a number of ways.
Despite the prevailing punitive pressures, some state judges might
simply misinterpret Teague or choose to strengthen the retroactivity
rights of criminal defendants. Confusion or defiance might be able to
explain a few cases as well. Neither of these explanations, however, can
account for why courts in one in nine of these cases—across so many
different jurisdictions, and for so many different procedural rules—have
relaxed the clear-cut requirements for what constitutes a watershed. If
misinterpretations alone explained this result, one might expect the
errors to go in both directions, as with judicial leniency at the margins.
Crim. App. 2003); State v. Dunn, 2001-KA-1635, p. 25 n.21 (La. 11/1/02); 831 So. 2d 862, 882
n.21; Johnson v. State, 102 S.W.3d 535, 539 n.12 (Mo. 2003); and Pickens v. State, 1969 OK CR
55, ¶ 9, 74 P.3d 601, 602 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003).
213. Casiano, 115 A.3d at 1037 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 1038.
215. Id. at 1041 (emphases added).
216. Id. at 1042 (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 507 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. As explained previously, state courts have discretion to abandon the Teague standard for a
more forgiving approach to retroactivity. Yet the overwhelming majority of those courts have not.
Indeed, all but seven states have explicitly adopted Teague’s watershed retroactivity doctrine. See
supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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Yet we see only inflations of this doctrine. What makes sense of these
one-sided findings and the watershed puzzle more generally, we have
argued, is the dynamic concentration theory of limited-resource
enforcement.
CONCLUSION
This Article refutes the conventional wisdom that portrays watershed
doctrine as futile. It showed that this doctrine plays an important role in
our constitutional criminal procedure. Its low-probability but extreme
threat of repealing scores of convictions gives reason for state courts to
align their decisions with the more generous due process system that
existing precedents project into the future. The resulting safe harbor
compensates for the Supreme Court’s inability to scrutinize every
decision by state courts or to specify each demand of constitutional
criminal procedure.
This watershed incentive to align state criminal procedures with a
broader vision of due process softens the critique that Teague offers
defendants no protection.220 This theory supports a prediction, for
example, that state courts may soon start remodeling their criminal
sentencing procedures by enacting stringent admissibility standards for
prosecution’s evidence. The Supreme Court has in two recent and farreaching decisions declared that factually undistorted sentencing
decisions are as critical to fairness in the criminal process as accurate
determination of guilt.221 This appreciation may accordingly lead state
courts to anticipate that many, if not all, constitutional prerequisites of
fair trial will carry over to the sentencing stage and that some might
apply retroactively.222
220. See, e.g., Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 195; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 46, at 1816–17
(1991); Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423,
423–24 (1994).
221. See Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“The reality is that plea
bargains have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render
the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at
critical stages.”); Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (extending the right to
effective assistance of counsel to plea bargaining and rejecting the claim that “[a] fair trial wipes
clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining” because “[t]hat position
ignores the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas” (citing Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407)).
222. One of those changes might be a ban on testimonial inculpatory hearsay statements from
declarants who did not testify, where that hearsay might lead to an imposition of the death penalty
or another aggravated sentence on the convicted defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Umaña, 750
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The watershed dynamic revealed here suggests broader implications
as well. Retroactive constitutional remediation can benefit society in
areas beyond criminal investigation and trial. The Supreme Court’s
limited working capacity forces it to ration the production of precedents
in ways that shape the substance of the Court’s constitutional
decisions.223 Implementation of the watershed mechanism in the domain
of civil rights especially, for example, would enable the Court to ease
this tension between rationing and substance.224

F.3d 320, 360–68 (4th Cir. 2014) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 762 F.3d 413 (4th
Cir. 2014) (opining that Sixth Amendment bans such statements); see also Note, Criminal
Procedure—Confrontation Clause—Fourth Circuit Finds No Right to Confrontation During
Sentence Selection Phase of Capital Trial, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1027, 1033–34 (2015) (arguing that
the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, if not the Sixth Amendment,
calls for suppressing testimonial inculpatory hearsay statements tendered in support of capital
punishment when defendant cannot cross-examine declarant).
223. See generally RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 133–34
(1996); Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE
L.J. 422 (2012).
224. On the difficulties that retroactive remedies present, see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 46, at
1791–97.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Watershed Inflations (27 cases)
1. Acra v. State, 105 So. 3d 460, 467 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (State v.
Adams, 91 So. 3d 724 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)).
2. In re Gomez, 199 P.3d 574, 580 (Cal. 2009) (Blakely).
3. In re Willover, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 156 (Ct. App.) (Miller),
superseded by 351 P.3d 328 (Cal. 2015).
4. In re Rainey, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 724–25 (Ct. App.) (Miller),
superseded by 326 P.3d 251 (Cal. 2014).
5. Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1037, 1042–1043
(Conn. 2015) (Miller), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, 136
S. Ct. 1364 (2016).
6. People v. Johnson, 2013 IL App (5th) 110112, ¶¶ 18–24, 998 N.E.2d
185, 194–95 (Miller).
7. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013) (Miller).
8. State v. Simmons, 2011-1810, p. 1–2 (La. 10/12/12); 99 So. 3d 28,
28 (per curiam) (Miller).
9. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 904 (Mass. 2011)
(Padilla).
10. Commonwealth v. Halbert, No. 1988-14286, 2013 WL 5529328, at
*2–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 16, 2013) (Miller).
11. Jones v. State, 2009-CT-02033-SCT (¶ 18) (Miss. 2013), 122 So. 3d
698, 703 (Miller).
12. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268–69 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)
(Ring).
13. Branch v. Cassady, No. WD 77788, 2015 WL 160718, at *8–9 (Mo.
Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2015) (Miller), cause ordered transferred to Mo.
Sup. Ct. (Mar. 31, 2015).
14. State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb.) (Miller), cert. denied
Nebraska v. Mantich, 135 S. Ct. 67 (2014).
15. In re State, 103 A.3d 227, 233–34 (N.H. 2014) (Miller), cert. denied
sub nom. New Hampshire v. Soto, No. 14-639, 2016 WL 854309
(U.S. Mar. 7, 2016).
16. Ramirez v. State, 2014-NMSC-023, ¶ 2, 333 P.3d 240 (Padilla and
State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799 (N.M. 2004)).
17. State v. Forbes, 119 P.3d 144, 147–48 (N.M. 2005) (Crawford).
18. People v. De Jesus, No. 10335/98, 2010 WL 5300535, at *9 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2010) (Padilla).
19. People v. Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897, 905 (Sup. Ct. 2004)
(Crawford).
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20. State v. Zuniga, 444 S.E.2d 443, 446–47 (N.C. 1994) (McKoy).
21. Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 575 (S.C. 2014) (Miller), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2379 (2015).
22. Talley v. State, 640 S.E.2d 878, 882 (S.C. 2007) (Shelton).
23. Darden v. State, No. M2013-01328-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 992097,
at *9–10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2014) (Van Tran v. State, 66
S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001)).
24. Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 345 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)
(Sandstrom).
25. Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(Miller).
26. Aguilar v. State, 375 S.W.3d 518, 524 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012)
(Padilla), vacated, 393 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
27. State v. Mares, 2014 WY 126, ¶ 2, 335 P.3d 487, 491 (Miller).
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Table 2: Watershed Inflations Excluded Due to Overlap with Similar
State Decisions (16 cases).225
1. In re Wilson, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 790–91 (Ct. App.) (Miller
overlaps In re Rainey), rev. granted and opinion superseded by 367
P.3d 26 (Cal. 2015).
2. In re Watson, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 403, 408–10 (Ct. App. 2010)
(Cunningham overlaps Gomez).
3. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 39, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Miller
upholds Davis (2012) and overlaps Johnson and Williams), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014).
4. People v. Arrieta, 2014 IL App (2d) 130035-U, ¶ 15 (Miller overlaps
Johnson, Davis, and Williams).
5. People v. Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 111145, 982 N.E.2d 181
(Miller overlaps Johnson), abrogated by People v. Davis, 2014 IL
115595, 6 N.E.3d 709.
6. People v. Cooks, 2012 IL App (1st) 112991-U, ¶¶ 16–18 (Miller
overlaps Johnson, Davis, and Williams).
7. People v. Morfin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103568, ¶¶ 47–56, 981 N.E.2d
1010, 1020–22 (Miller overlaps Johnson, Davis, Williams, and
Cooks).
8. People v. Davis, 2012 IL App. (1st) 112577-U, ¶ 16 (Miller overlaps
Johnson and Williams).
9. Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 278
(Mass. 2013) (Miller overlaps Halbert).
10. State v. Ramirez, 2012-NMCA-057, ¶¶ 4–5, 278 P.3d 569, 570–71
(Padilla upheld by Ramirez (2014)).
11. People v. Bevans, No. 20704V-2008, 2011 WL 923077, at *7 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 2011) (Padilla overlaps De Jesus).
12. People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 404–05 (Sup. Ct. 2010)
(Padilla overlaps De Jesus and Bevans).
13. People v. Watson, 827 N.Y.S.2d 822, 830–33 (Sup. Ct. 2007)
(Crawford overlaps Dobbin).
14. People v. Encarnacion, No. 5804/95, 2005 WL 433252, at *8, *17
n.6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 2005) (Crawford overlaps Dobbin and
Watson).

225. For each citation in this table, the first case noted parenthetically indicates the Supreme
Court precedent on which the state court was relying. Any cases following the word “overlaps”
indicate preceding decisions issued within the same state concerning the same subject matter.
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15. People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *9 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2004) (Crawford overlaps Dobbin, Encarnacion, and Watson
(2007)).
16. Brewer v. State, No. 1179, 1991 WL 21605, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Feb. 22, 1991) (Sandstrom overlaps Adkins).
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Table 3: Watershed Decisions that Align with Teague Doctrine (201
cases)
1. Ex parte Williams, 183 So. 3d 220, 233 (Ala. 2015), vacated sub
nom., Williams v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1365 (2016).
2. Williams v. State, 183 So. 3d 198, 218 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014),
vacated, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1365 ( 2016).
3. Bush v. State, 92 So. 3d 121, 132 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
4. Poole v. State, 846 So. 2d 370, 388 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001),
overruled by Lightfoot v. State, 152 So. 3d 445 (Ala. 2013).
5. State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1146–47 (Alaska 2009).
6. State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 835–36 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc).
7. State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1043 (Ariz. 1996).
8. State v. Poblete, 260 P.3d 1102, 1107 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
9. State v. Molina, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0003-PR, 2010 WL 1511427, at
*1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2010).
10. State v. Febles, 115 P.3d 629, 635 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
11. State v. Sepulveda, 32 P.3d 1085, 1087–88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
12. People v. Trujeque, 349 P.3d 103, 119–22 (Cal. 2015).
13. In re Saade, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 51–52 (Ct. App. 2008), superseded
by Saade on H.C., 190 P.3d 535 (Cal. 2009).
14. In re Gomez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 281, 286 (Ct. App. 2007), rev’d, 199
P.3d 574 (Cal. 2009).
15. In re Moore, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 611–12 (Ct. App. 2005).
16. People v. Amons, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908, 916–17 (Ct. App. 2005).
17. People v. Tate, 2015 CO 42, ¶ 10, 352 P.3d 959, 963, overruling
recognized by People v. Wilder, 2016 COA 23.
18. People v. Johnson, 142 P.3d 722, 728 (Colo. 2006) (en banc).
19. People v. McDowell, 219 P.3d 332, 338 (Colo. App. 2009).
20. People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415, 442 (Colo. App. 2006).
21. Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 979 (Colo. 2006) (en banc).
22. People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118, 1124 (Colo. App. 2004), aff’d,
129 P.3d 977 (Colo. 2006).
23. People v. Bradbury, 68 P.3d 494, 499 (Colo. App. 2002).
24. Thiersaint v. Comm’r of Corr., 111 A.3d 829, 839 (Conn. 2015).
25. Duperry v. Solnit, 803 A.2d 287, 300 (Conn. 2002).
26. Garcia v. Comm’r of Corr., 84 A.3d 1, 7–8 (Conn. App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 93 A.3d 156 (Conn. 2014).
27. Garcia v. Warden, No. TSRCV084002573, 2011 WL 3335413, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 8, 2011), aff’d sub nom. Garcia v. Comm’r of
Corr., 84 A.3d 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014).
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28. Watson v. Warden, No. CV970400369S, 2007 WL 706591, at *3–4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Watson v. Comm’r
of Corr., 958 A.2d 782 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
29. Gathers v. United States, 977 A.2d 969, 972–73 (D.C. 2009).
30. Richardson v. State, 3 A.3d 233, 239 (Del. 2010).
31. State v. Desmond, No. 91009844DI, 2013 WL 1090965, at *2 (Del.
Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2013).
32. State v. McGriff, No. 93002189DI, 2006 WL 1515831, at *8 (Del.
Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2006), aff’d, No. 49, 2006, 2007 WL 1454883
(Del. May 18, 2007).
33. Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 412 (Fla. 2005).
34. Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 846 (Fla. 2005).
35. Figarola v. State, 841 So. 2d 576, 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
36. State v. Sosa, 733 S.E.2d 262, 265 (Ga. 2012).
37. Carter v. Johnson, 599 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ga. 2004).
38. Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 619 (Ga. 2003).
39. State v. Auld, 361 P.3d 471, 483 (Haw. 2015).
40. State v. Gomes, 113 P.3d 184, 189–90 (Haw. 2005).
41. State v. Owens, 343 P.3d 30, 35–36 (Idaho 2015).
42. Gutierrez-Medina v. State, 333 P.3d 849, 858 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014),
rev. denied (Sept. 15, 2014).
43. Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61, 70–71 (Idaho 2010).
44. Hoffman v. State, 121 P.3d 958, 960 (Idaho 2005).
45. Jacobs v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 835 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. 2005).
46. Drach v. Bruce, 136 P.3d 390, 403–04 (Kan. 2006).
47. Easterwood v. State, 44 P.3d 1209, 1223 (Kan. 2002).
48. Whisler v. State, 36 P.3d 290, 300 (Kan. 2001).
49. Verge v. State, 335 P.3d 679, 684 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014), rev. denied
(June 29, 2015).
50. Hollingsworth v. State, No. 106,357, 2012 WL 718971, at *7 (Kan.
Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2012).
51. People v. Smith, 2015 IL 116572, ¶ 34, 26 N.E.3d 335, 343.
52. People v. Sanders, 939 N.E.2d 352, 364 (Ill. 2010).
53. People v. Morris, 925 N.E.2d 1069, 1080 (Ill. 2010).
54. People v. De La Paz, 791 N.E.2d 489, 496–97 (Ill. 2003).
55. People v. Hickey, 792 N.E.2d 232, 259–60 (Ill. 2001).
56. People v. Caballero, 688 N.E.2d 658, 665 (Ill. 1997).
57. People v. Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 12281-U, ¶¶ 15–17.
58. People v. Miller, 2015 IL App (1st) 130918-U, ¶ 14.
59. People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (2d) 140388, ¶¶ 9–11, 29 N.E.3d
1181, 1186.
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60. People v. Reed, 2014 IL App (1st) 122610, ¶ 94, 25 N.E.3d 10, 34.
61. People v. Talavera, 2013 IL App (2d) 120232-U, ¶ 58 n.5.
62. People v. Johnson, 2013 IL App (5th) 110112, ¶ 22, 998 N.E.2d
185, 194–95, appeal denied, 3 N.E.3d 799 (Ill. 2014), appeal
denied, 23 N.E.3d 1204 (Ill. 2015).
63. People v. Avery, 2012 IL App (1st) 110298, ¶ 46, 974 N.E.2d 266.
64. People v. Jones, 2011 IL App (5th) 070370-U, ¶ 15.
65. People v. Gutierrez, 2011 IL App (1st) 093499, ¶ 42, 954 N.E.2d
365, 378.
66. People v. Lucas, No. 2-09-0895, 2011 WL 10099132, at *2–3 (Ill.
App. Ct. May 9, 2011).
67. People v. Ramirez, No. 2-09-0765, 2011 WL 10099636, at *2 (Ill.
App. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011).
68. People v. Tripp, 944 N.E.2d 405, 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
69. People v. Sanders, 911 N.E.2d 1096, 1107–08 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009),
aff’d, 939 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 2010).
70. Weidner v. Cowan, 838 N.E.2d 179, 180–81 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
71. People v. Schrader, 820 N.E.2d 489, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
72. People v. Turner, 785 N.E.2d 879, 886–88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
73. People v. Gholston, 772 N.E.2d 880, 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
74. People v. Kizer, 741 N.E.2d 1103, 1115 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
75. State v. Mohler, 694 N.E.2d 1129, 1137 (Ind. 1998).
76. Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487, 491–92 (Ind. 1990).
77. Lyons v. State, No. 48A02-0911-PC-1126, 2010 WL 1987741, at *7
(Ind. Ct. App. May 19, 2010).
78. Leatherwood v. State, 880 N.E.2d 315, 320–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
79. Baxter v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1254, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
80. Cossel v. State, 675 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
81. State v. Silva, 668 N.E.2d 718, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
82. Long v. State, 645 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
83. Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354, 361 (Iowa 2012).
84. Morgan v. State, 469 N.W.2d 419, 425 (Iowa 1991).
85. Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 81–82 (Iowa 1989).
86. Stewart v. State, 676 So. 2d 87, 89 (La. 1996).
87. State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1299–1300 (La.
1992).
88. State v. Tate, 2012-2763, p. 16–17 (La. 11/5/13); 130 So. 3d 829,
841, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014), abrogated by
Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
89. State v. Huntley, 2013-127, p. 12–13 (La. App. 3 Cir. 7/10/13); 118
So. 3d 95, 103.
90. State v. Sam, 623 So. 2d 1, 1 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
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91. Carmichael v. State, 2007 ME 86, ¶¶ 27, 42, 927 A.2d 1172, 1179,
1181.
92. Grandison v. State, 38 A.3d 352, 370 (Md. 2012).
93. Miller v. State, 77 A.3d 1030, 1043–44 (Md. Ct. App. 2013).
94. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 866–67 (Mass. 2014).
95. Commonwealth v. Phillips, No. 10-P-337, 2011 WL 1761537, at *1
n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. May 10, 2011).
96. Commonwealth v. Arnaut, 940 N.E.2d 1232, 1233–34 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2011).
97. Commonwealth v. Peppicelli, 872 N.E.2d 1142, 1152 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2007).
98. Commonwealth v. Hampton, 831 N.E.2d 341, 347 (Mass. App. Ct.
2005).
99. Commonwealth v. Kartell, No. 1999-0655, 2005 WL 2739786, at
*11–13 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2005).
100. People v. Maxson, 759 N.W.2d 817, 825 (Mich. 2008).
101. People v. Houlihan, 706 N.W.2d 731, 732 (Mich. 2005).
102. People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 713–15 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012),
aff’d, 852 N.W.2d 801 (Mich. 2014), vacated sub nom., Davis v.
Michigan, __ U.S __, 136 S. Ct. 1356 (2016).
103. Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 330 (Minn. 2013), abrogated
by Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
104. Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 498–99 (Minn. 2012).
105. State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2005).
106. O’Connell v. State, 858 N.W.2d 161, 166 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015),
rev. granted (Mar. 25, 2015).
107. Shaw v. State, No. A14-0745, 2014 WL 7344306, at *4 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 29, 2014).
108. Pantoja-Coronado v. State, No. A12-0952, 2013 WL 2301812, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2013).
109. El Eid v. State, No. A11-0898, 2013 WL 141628, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 14, 2013).
110. Sasic v. State, No. A11-1221, 2012 WL 4856143, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Oct. 15, 2012).
111. Odegard v. State, 767 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
112. State v. Petschl, 688 N.W.2d 866, 875 (Minn. Ct. App.), opinion
withdrawn and superseded by 692 N.W.2d 463 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004).
113. Meemken v. State, 662 N.W.2d 146, 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
114. Manning v. State, 2001-DR-00230-SCT (¶¶ 32–42), 929 So. 2d
885, 900 (Miss. 2006).
115. Nixon v. State, 641 So. 2d 751, 755 (Miss. 1994).

06 - Fox & Stein.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

5/30/2016 3:50 PM

WATERSHEDS

511

116. State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 651–52 (Mo. 2011)
(en banc).
117. Gratzer v. Mahoney, 2006 MT 282, ¶ 14, 334 Mont. 297, 150 P.3d
343.
118. State v. Nichols, 1999 MT 212, ¶ 16, 295 Mont. 489, 493, 986 P.2d
1093, 1096–97, overruled by State v. Whitehorn, 2002 MT 54, 309
Mont. 63, 50 P.3d 121.
119. State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 267 (Mont. 1995), rev’d, 518 U.S.
37 (1996).
120. Branch v. Cassady, No. WD 77788, 2015 WL 160718, at *8–9
(Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2015), cause ordered transferred to Mo. S.
Ct. (Mar. 31, 2015).
121. State v. Lotter, 664 N.W.2d 892, 908 (Neb. 2003).
122. State v. Alshaif, 724 S.E.2d 597, 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
123. State v. Tallard, 816 A.2d 977, 981 (N.H. 2003).
124. State v. Gonsalves, No. 95-S-038, 2001 WL 34012421, at *2 (N.H.
Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2001).
125. Croft v. Coplan, No. 01-E-066, 2001 WL 34013571, at *4–5 (N.H.
Super. Ct. May 22, 2001).
126. Ennis v. State, 137 P.3d 1095, 1101–02 (Nev. 2006).
127. Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 472–73 (Nev. 2002).
128. State v. Gaitan, 37 A.3d 1089, 1108 (N.J. 2012).
129. State v. Purnell, 735 A.2d 513, 520, 523–24 (N.J. 1999).
130. State v. J.A., 942 A.2d 149, 159 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
131. State v. Cupe, 672 A.2d 1233, 1239 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996).
132. Dominguez v. State, 2015-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 24–25, 348 P.3d 183,
191.
133. Kersey v. Hatch, 237 P.3d 683, 693 (N.M. 2010).
134. State v. Frawley, 2007-NMSC-057, ¶¶ 42–44, 143 N.M. 7, 172
P.3d 144.
135. People v. Baret, 16 N.E.3d 1218, 1228–31 (N.Y. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 961 (2015).
136. People v. Vatic, No. 2008BX5805, 2013 WL 2450502, at *2–3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 31, 2013).
137. People v. Ramirez, No. 4676/1996, 2012 WL 1193762, at *3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 11, 2012), aff’d, 993 N.Y.S.2d 893 (App. Div. 2014).
138. People v. Valerio, No. 1893/96, 2012 WL 3854863, at *4–5 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Sept. 6, 2012).
139. People v. Santana, No. 0542/1997, 2012 WL 2377788, at *7–8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 19, 2012).
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